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Joe Ditzel, a member of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) Federal Labor 
Union (FLU) local #18384, described his local as a “rank and file union built by the rank and 
file.” The fact that they had this “strong union…in Toledo wasn’t due to anything the AFL 
did” but what “the workers [did]…themselves.”1 His sentiments reflects the grassroots 
energy and action that shaped this auto worker union local and made it “the beacon light for 
automobile workers throughout the country” before the establishment of an International 
United Auto Worker (UAW) union in 1935.2 During that time, as Ditzel described it, they 
“more or less had the idea that anything that had to be done, [they would] have to do it 
[themselves].”3 That attitude of self-reliance was rooted in the origins and development of 
the FLU local marked by struggle and rank and file militancy and activity.  
This thesis focuses on that historical narrative from the perspective of the workers 
within FLU local #18384. From this bottom-up approach, one sees the social and community 
dynamics from which these individuals interacted with and drew strength from. This local 
dimension reflects what Staughton Lynd calls “alternative unionism” that he claims existed 
before the formation of the labor federation Congress of Industrial Organization in 1935. 
This model of organization, according to Lynd, was characterized by grassroots, community-
oriented, democratic entities, rooted in local autonomy. As an FLU local with little 
institutional support from the national AFL, the formation and development of this Toledo 
auto worker union was based on the grassroots energy of its membership in relation to a left-
wing influence and the community.  
                                                 
1 Joseph Ditzel, interview by Tana Mosier, March 5, 1981 and April 16, 1981, p. 47 of transcript, Blade Rare 
Book Room, Toledo-Lucas County Public Library. 
2 Burke Cochran, “Dillon to Pack Convention of Auto Workers,”  New Militant,  Aug. 34, 1935. 
3 Ditzel, interview with Mosier, March 5, 1981 and April 16, 1981, p. 48, Blade Rare Book Room. 
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Receiving its charter in August of 1933, the FLU local #18384 was, in part, a product 
of President Franklin Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) – his first New 
Deal Initiative to counteract the economic and social impacts of the Great Depression. Passed 
in June 1933, section 7(a) of this legislation proclaimed the right of workers to organize and 
collectively bargain with employers. Although the text of section 7(a) was poorly worded 
(and ultimately, poorly enforced) this historic government sanction of unionism inspired an 
outburst of labor organizing across the country. Following the passage of NIRA, the AFL, a 
federation of all the trade unions in the US, sought to take advantage of this unionizing 
impulse by announcing a campaign to organize workers in the auto industry. Steeped in 
conservative craft unionism (organizing workers along particular trades or occupations in 
various industries), the AFL brought these auto workers into federal labor unions with the 
plan to eventually parcel them out to its various trade unions. These auto worker federal labor 
unions had a direct relationship with the national AFL but little contact between one another. 
The history of this Toledo local as a federal labor union that precedes both the 
creation of the International UAW and the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) makes 
it an ideal case study in the growing debate among scholars over Lynd’s notion of 
“alternative unionism.”4 He argues that this horizontal organizational model was supplanted 
with the emergence of the CIO and its top-down inclinations. This in turn became a missed 
opportunity for the labor movement during the 1930s as it shifted towards national 
bureaucratic unionism. Historian Elizabeth Faue, in a similar line of thought, argues that 
                                                 
4 (1997) '"We Are All Leaders’: A Symposium on a Collection of 
Essays Dealing with Alternative Unionism in the Early 1930s”, Labor History, 38:2, 
165 - 201 
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“working class activism” of the 1930s was “local activism” that stayed away from 
“established bureaucratic union structures.”5 
This thesis argues that the grassroots, community oriented struggle of “alternative 
unionism” that defined the origins of FLU local #18384 became the basis for broader 
national struggle within the auto industry. As the historian Rosemary Feurer argues, “any 
national framework of unionism required building solidarity at the local level” in which “the 
union movement needed to be able to address the local structuring of the political economy 
to confront effectively the power of capital at the national level.”6 Much has already been 
written about both the 1934 Auto Lite strike and the 1935 Toledo Chevrolet strike, as they 
were critical moments in the development of the broader labor movement in the automobile 
industry during the 1930s.7 But the local dimension underlying these important episodes (and 
which this study seeks to illustrate) has yet to be fully examined.  
In this respect, the events of the 1934 Auto Lite strike culminated in a community 
uprising and a potential general strike which successfully challenged the power structure of 
business hegemony over the city’s economy. This subsequently forced the Auto Lite 
Company to sign a collective bargaining contract with the FLU local. The efforts of a rank 
and file group within the local #18384 allied with the Lucas County Unemployed League 
(LCUL) galvanized the community through mass civil disobedience to eventually defeat a 
devastating court restraining order on picketing initially accepted by union leadership. 
Moreover the turn towards mass civil disobedience ushered in the subsequent turn of events 
                                                 
5 Elizabeth Faue, Community of Suffering & Struggle (Chapel Hill:London: The University of North Carolina 
Press 1991), 12. 
6  Rosemary Feurer, Radical Unionism in the Midwest (Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 2006), 234. 
7 Sidney Fine, The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963) 283, 402, 
Sidney Fine, “The Toledo Chevrolet Strike of 1935,”, Ohio History 67 (1958): 326-356; Irving Bernstein, 
Turbulent Years: a history of the American worker (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 223 
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that created ultimate victory for the FLU local in the form of a signed contract with the Auto 
Lite Company. This outcome also reinvigorated the broader labor movement in Toledo.   
The militant cadre of active rank and file members that emerged from the conflict of 
the second Auto Lite strike in 1934 became the progressive element within the Toledo auto 
worker union. They were shaped in some fashion by the Auto Lite strike experience as well 
as their ties with LCUL and the Workers Party to form what historian David Montgomery 
calls “the militant minority” those who “endeavored to weld their workmates and neighbors 
into a self-aware and purposeful working class.”8 Individuals within this group, in an 
atmosphere of renewed organized labor activity in the city, became the catalyst for 
organizing the Toledo General Motors (GM) Chevrolet plant as well as the subsequent strike 
there in 1935. The walk out which successfully stopped operation in this key transmissions 
plant and shut down GM production in plants around the country gave the action national 
implications. Moreover, during this time, the Toledo strikers initiated an effort to coordinate 
nationally among GM FLU locals for a common strike policy in order to obtain a shared 
agreement. 
When this initiative was squashed by both the AFL national leadership and local 
#18384’s executive board, the progressive elements among the rank and file of #18384 
turned to the broader rank and file movement  involved in creating an International United 
Auto Worker (UAW) union based on a democratic, bottom-up model controlled by 
membership. With that institutional support more or less in place, the rank and file initiative 
to obtain a national agreement from GM that began during the Toledo Chevrolet strike of 
1935 reached a climax with the victorious Flint sit-downs of 1936-1937. Both in the period 
leading up to, and during, that historic conflict, leaders and members of UAW Local 14 
                                                 
8 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1987),2. 
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(formerly the Toledo Chevy unit of the FLU local #18384) played a crucial role in supporting 
the effort. 
However, during this period, the activism of progressives within the FLU local was 
rarely uncontested. As James Roland, one of the leading progressives in the Toledo union put 
it “there were some of them that were conservative and reactionary and we were 
progressive…that’s the way it was.”9 During the Auto Lite strikes, some members. especially 
on the executive committee, distrusted the presence of the left wing groups. Such attitudes 
spilled over in the months following the Auto Lite strikes when the progressives, some of 
whom still had ties with the LCUL and the Workers Party, attempted to extend their 
influence by running slates of candidates during elections for both shop committees and the 
executive committee. During that period, the AFL national increased its influence on the 
executive committee, at the request of union officers, through the presence of its 
representatives to help work out the factionalism and through its control of funds supplied to 
the local. The 1935 Toledo Chevrolet strike further demonstrated the division and clash 
between progressives and parts of the executive committee. Following the establishment of 
the UAW International, indifference on the executive committee towards the interests and 
needs of the Chevrolet unit as it faced efforts by GM to undermine their union led to that 
shop’s petition for a separate charter. As Local 14, the progressives came to the fore in 
leadership of the union and could push forward their desire to get a national agreement with 
GM as well as support organizing efforts around Toledo.   
Through this rank and file history of the Toledo FLU one gets a local understanding 
of what became a developing grassroots movement among auto workers underlying the 
                                                 
9 James Roland, interview by Tana Mosier Aug. 12, 1981, p. 88 of transcript, Blade Rare Book Room, Toledo-
Lucas Country Public Library. 
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creation of the UAW International.  This, in part, is what made the Flint sit-down strikes so 
successful and brought instant legitimacy to the organization. Bob Travis, one of the primary 
organizers of this historic struggle, emerged out of the Toledo Chevy strike as a member of 
its shop committee and drew his early inspiration and influence from Roland to get involved 
and his interest in left wing politics. Moreover, historian Sidney Fine asserts that “the UAW 
did not expect to win the GM [Flint] strike by the use of words but rather by the mobilization 
and deployment of such power…available…to put maximum pressure on the corporation.”10 
Local 14 provided one of the primary bases of membership support to reinforce the efforts 
taking place in Flint at moments when such help was needed both inside and outside the 
plants. The rank and file energy emanating out of Toledo to support this national effort can 
only be understood by examining the successful struggles that entrenched the presence of 




















                                                 










CHAPTER ONE:  "A Community Uprising" 
Emergence of the FLU local #18384, Radicals and the Auto Lite Strikes 
 
Introduction 
American Federation of Labor Federal Labor Union local #18384 formed in 1933 in 
Toledo, Ohio.  It emerged during a period shaped by both local as well as national events. 
The Great Depression had sparked the June 1933 passage of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act  (NIRA) in June, a federal initiative to address the economic woes of the country. Section 
7(a) of the NIRA was particularly important for the cause of organized labor in the US for it 
seemingly solidified the right of workers to organize and collectively bargain. Though poorly 
worded and enforced, the measure sparked an outburst of union organizing in various 
industries across the country. It encouraged the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the 
only federation of labor unions in the US at the time, to tap into this union sentiment by 
undertaking a formal organizing drive within the auto industry.  Steeped in conservative craft 
unionism (organizing workers along certain trades and skills), the AFL sought to organize the 
auto workers into temporary federal labor unions (FLU) with the plan to divide up into the 
various AFL trade unions. On the local level, Toledo was hit quite hard by the Great 
Depression with large pockets of unemployed workers. The city had experienced an 
especially widespread bank collapse due to the build up of faulty loans and investments for 
over a decade.  At the time, organized labor within the city was especially struggling after 
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over a decade of union busting at the hands of the city’s business elite, the collapse of their 
union-run bank, and rising unemployment.  
The FLU local #18384 emerged from these troubling economic conditions having 
formally attained its charter in August of 1933 with an amalgamated structure (having more 
than one shop under a union charter). Beginning in the Willys-Overland plant, the FLU local, 
driven by the grassroots energy of its members, expanded to several auto part plants by 
February 1934 including, most importantly, the Electric Auto-Lite plant. This company was 
one of the largest independent auto part suppliers and with an openly hostile management 
towards organized labor became the union’s first real test. Auto Lite shop committee, which 
only had one department organized, joined in the FLU local’s first walkout on February 23, 
1934 along side Bingham Stamping, Logan Gears and Spicer Manufacturing. 
 During that five day strike, few Auto Lite workers actually participated in the action 
and only about fifteen walked the picket line. But their numbers were reinforced by 
supporting Spicer workers who made up the largest portion of those involved in the walk out 
and eventually succeeded in including them in the temporary agreement that ended the strike. 
This settlement though very minimal, provided a partial victory for each of the FLU local 
shops involved with small wage increases and a thirty day period to negotiate final 
agreements with their employers which subsequently strengthened the union presence in their 
respective plants. In the Auto Lite plant, this outcome helped the shop committee organize 
most of the workforce but management opposed any attempts at negotiations and had hired 
more workers and bought a cache of munitions during the strike in preparation for a 
showdown. 
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On April 13th as management remained intransigent to collective bargaining, the Auto 
Lite union members voted to go on strike and 400 workers walked out. Though only a 
minority of the workforce participated, sympathizers including various left wing groups, the 
unemployed and others within the FLU local helped build up their picket line in its first few 
days. Moreover women, of who were a majority of the employees in the Auto Lite plant, 
became much more active and involved during this second strike on the picket line. The Auto 
Lite Company, drawing on violent outbursts on the picket line between strikers and 
strikebreakers, immediately turned to the courts for an injunction against the strike. Judge 
Stuart, who oversaw this injunction suit, called for a restriction on picketing to limited 
number of individuals allowed as well as banning all nonunion personnel from participating. 
Moreover, since much of the police were sympathetic to the strikers, to enforce the 
restraining order Sheriff Krieger, on the advice of Judge Stuart, appointed special deputies. 
The FLU local officers subsequently complied with the judicial ruling and turned their 
energy towards fighting the injunction suit in the court room.  
But for the FLU local membership, such compliance was devastating. By early May, 
numbers on the picket line were dwindling down and the Auto Lite company continued to 
bring in strikebreakers. At that point, a group of FLU local members sought out Lucas 
County Unemployed League (LCUL), an organizing arm for the radical left wing American 
Workers Party, for assistance. As a result, an alliance between the two groups was built to 
redirect the strike towards breaking the restraining order through mass civil disobedience. On 
May 7th, after writing an open letter to Judge Stuart about this decision two days, the two 
officers of LCUL and two union members jump-started the action by getting arrested in 
violation of the court ordered picketing restrictions. In the following weeks the numbers of 
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individuals involved in this civil disobedience grew as the Sheriff continued to make mass 
arrests. At the same time, the court room during the trials for prosecuting those violators 
became public forums for mobilizing mass support for the strikers. Such acts galvanized the 
broader community as numbers on the picket line by late May grew to the thousands. 
Moreover the city couldn’t continue to bear the costs of the Sheriff’s mass arrests limiting the 
enforcement of the restraining order. 
 On May 23rd, in face of this growing crowd, Sheriff Krieger, with the encouragement 
of the Auto Lite company, to enforce the injunction more vigorously bombarded them with 
tear gas to disperse the picket line after the crowd charged forward in response to a steel rod 
thrown from the factory that struck a woman. This act increased the crowd on the picket line 
which subsequently surrounded the plant and refused to let the people inside leave. In 
response to this siege, the Auto Lite company urged the Governor to call in the National 
Guard and he in turn complied with this request. The National Guard, composed of young 
soldiers, with the mission of escorting out the workers and dispersing the picket line, faced a 
hostile crowd that resented their presence. Eventually the soldiers and the picket line clashed 
as each side charged on one another and the national guardsman threw tear gas at them. After 
many wounded and two killed, the fighting ceased after May 26th and with Auto Lite 
production now effectively stopped, negotiations began between the union and the company. 
By June 2nd an agreement was reached in which the Auto Lite management conceded union 
recognition among other things and ratified by membership on June 4th.  
Along side this growing militancy on the picket line from the beginning of May 
onward was that, at least in rhetoric, of the broader Toledo labor movement through the AFL 
body the Toledo Central Labor Union. As time went on sentiments among the Toledo Central 
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Labor Union (CLU) affiliates for a general strike grew. The leaders of this AFL body, many 
of them older with memories of the business assault on organized labor in Toledo during the 
1920s following the failed Overland strike of 1919, feared that a lost strike at the Auto Lite 
plant would have the same effect. By May 30, 95 of the 100 trade unions affiliated with the 
Toledo (CLU) had voted in favor of a general strike. The fact that this Auto Lite strike 
became a focal point for the city’s labor movement increased the significance of its positive 
outcome. 
Thus the initial small strike and the second longer, dramatic strike at the Auto Lite 
Factory became formative experiences for Local 18384. In both struggles, but especially the 
latter one elements of solidarity among workers, the presence and influence of left wing 
groups, and the support of community and women were important to their successful 
outcomes for the FLU local.  During the second strike these factors helped the union 
successfully challenge the Toledo city economic and political power structure that had kept 
down organized labor in the past and as a result win a contract with the Auto Lite company. 
This in turn reinvigorated the energy and activity of local organized labor. Internally though 
the strike experience left lingering ideological questions within the FLU local with the 
emergence of a progressive element among its rank and file.  
 
Foundation of AFL Federal Labor Union local #18384 and organizing in the Auto Lite Plant 
The emergence of the AFL Federal Labor Union local #18384 in Toledo, Ohio and 
the ensuing Auto Lite Strike of 1934 that solidified its presence took place amongst the 
backdrop of events occurring both on a national and local level. The onset of the Great 
Depression in 1929 and President Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 
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June of 1933 that sought to counter-act the widespread economic devastation of the 
Depression jumpstarted a nationwide union organizing drive. Section 7(a) of NIRA 
establishing the right for workers to organize and collectively bargain, though ambiguously 
worded and poorly enforced, provided the spark for this outburst.11  
The American Federation of Labor (AFL), announcing an organizing campaign 
following this legislation, sought to channel this unionizing impulse in the auto industry. The 
AFL, rooted in a tradition of conservative craft unionism (organizing workers within various 
industries along the lines of their craft or trade), clumped these workers into federal labor 
unions (FLU) with the plan to eventually parcel them into the various AFL trade unions.  
Considered “wards” of the AFL, the FLUs lacked the trade autonomy prevalent in the other 
unions of the Federation. Although these locals usually elected their own leadership, the AFL 
exerted direct control over much of their activities as well as their strike defense fund. 
Collectively, they were referred to as the United Automobile Workers (UAW) Federal Labor 
Unions though, initially, they had no relationship with each other creating coordination 
problems between the locals.12   
Within Toledo, the Great Depression, especially the failure of the banks, hit the city 
hard. During the 1920s, Toledo had led the nation in manufacturing employment growth. But 
economic disaster struck by 1931 when five of Toledo’s largest banks failed, turning the city 
from the leader in job growth to that of job loss in the United States. This disaster in Toledo 
was rooted in the confluence of the city’s developing and banking interests who, through 
their influence over the city and state government, had facilitated and financed a massive real 
                                                 
11 John Barnard, American Vanguard : the United Auto Workers during the Reuther years (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press), 44. 
12 Sidney Fine, The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 142-
143. 
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estate bubble. In the years leading up to this bubble, the business community had united 
under the Merchants and Manufacturers Association to follow the lead of the national Open 
Shop Association in an assault on the city’s organized labor (which in 1919 consisted of one 
fifth of the Toledo work force). Beginning with the Overland strike of 1919 which was 
successfully put down by a court injunction, during the 1920s “the united front of 
government and business succeeded in breaking the back of the labor movement in Toledo.” 
When the real estate bubble burst in 1931 with the accumulation of poor long-term 
investments and loans, those major banks failed and wiped out $100 million dollars of assets 
that they controlled as well as other small town banks in the area. One small bank 
particularly impacted was American Bank, founded and controlled by many Toledo craft 
union locals that pooled their assets and membership dues. The city’s financial collapse 
wiped out their treasury, severely limiting their routine activities as they faced large wage 
cuts from Toledo employers and increasing unemployment. 13  
By the time the UAW FLU local #18384 was chartered in 1933, the general disarray 
of organized labor in Toledo was quite apparent. The city was considered by then as “a 
notorious cheap-labor, ‘scab’ town” while still being “the glass and auto parts center of 
America.”14 Despite these conditions, local # 18384 emerged following NIRA in the Willys-
Overland auto factory after it re-opened in 1932. The union “literally mushroomed 
overnight” at the Willys-Overland plant when, after an initial organizing drive, management 
heeded to their first ten demands, especially pay for overtime work. 15 Though the Willys-
Overland auto company remained in economic dire straits with limited employment until 
                                                 
13Timothy Messr-Kruse, Banksters, Bosses and Smart Money (Columbus: Ohio State University, 2004), 22- 88. 
14 A.J. Muste, Organized Labor and the Automobile Industry (Baltimore: Christian Social Justice Fund, 1936), 
37. 
15 George Addes, interview by Jack Skeels, June 25, 1960, p. 4 &5 of transcript, UAW Oral History Collection, 
Walter Reuther Archives, Wayne State University 
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1936, it became “the backbone of the organization” when local #18384 began expanding into 
other auto parts plants in the city.16  In August of 1933, when it received a federal labor union 
charter, the local had organizing bodies within five auto parts firms: Spicer Manufacturing 
Company, City Auto Stamping Company, the Electric Auto Lite Company and its 
subsidiaries Bingham Stamping and Tool Company, and Logan Gear Company.   
The passion and activity of its members fueled Local #18384’s expansion. The local 
had a central executive committee as well as individual shop committees in each company 
that pushed forward the organizing drive. Though there were officially elected positions 
within the union (such as president, business agent, and financial secretary), the organizing 
fervor trumped hierarchical structure. As one member of the executive committee, Frank 
Grzelak, described it at the beginning, “there wasn’t no officers…there were just organizers” 
who “had [their] heart in it…to get things organized and get the working people to get better 
working ideas and better wages.”17 Such fervor among the founding members to build up the 
local and its membership occurred with little support from the AFL. The organizers within 
the union came mainly from the plants seeking its support and mobilized other workers 
around them. Union democracy accompanied the grassroots organizing within the local. The 
various plant units that joined the union decided on their own governance and elected 
committees to draw up a constitution and various by-laws as well as selecting officers. 
Decision making on such rules and regulations along with creating additional ones came 
from the voice of membership.18 Thus, as an amalgamate local, through democratic control at 
                                                 
16 Phillip A. Korth and Margaret R. Beegle, I Remember Like Today (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1988), 145. 
17 Ibid, 145-146. 
18 Ibid, p. 146 
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the factory level, each plant unit could assert their own identity and influence over the 
manner in which the union would run at least on the shop floor. 
The structure of the local itself also played a crucial role in its future success within 
Toledo. By bringing together various local auto part plants into one union, the local created 
cross-company bonds that inculcated a sense of solidarity in the face of employers, especially 
those determined to crush their union. This was especially true in the case of the union 
organizing drive that took place at the Auto Lite factory. Furthermore, it unified these 
workers in a shared purpose for which they could, at a local level, express their collective 
interest with one voice in these independent auto parts and assembly companies in Toledo.  
The Auto Lite factory, as one of the largest Toledo employers and independent auto 
parts suppliers, would decide the fate of the FLU local in the city and became its first test as a 
union. The company manufactured auto parts, electric equipment for automobiles as well as 
assembly line replacement parts that they sold to automobile assembly companies like Ford 
and Willys-Overland (later to become Jeep). As an independent auto parts supplier, Auto Lite 
had to keep the prices of its products low in order to maintain steady business and contracts 
from the auto manufacturers. 19 Such a drive to maintain low prices contributed to an 
autocratic, harsh work regime for containing labor costs by maximizing worker output 
through a piecework process known as the Bedeaux system which emphasized worker speed 
through production quotas. The massive unemployment in the city during the Great 
Depression further strengthened managerial control over the work force through acts of 
favoritism, gender discrimination over pay and work, sporadic employment and work hours 
and constant surveillance.20 To top it off, the company paid below the National Recovery 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 39. 
20 Ibid, .47&48. 
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Administration (the department for implementing NIRA) code minimum for wages in the 
auto industry. Such conditions combined with the inspiration of NIRA’s section 7(a) made 
the factory ripe for organizing among workers. 
A unique character of the Auto Lite plant’s workforce, in comparison to the rest of 
automobile industry, was the fact that it was made up by a majority of women.  In the entire 
industry, women constituted about twenty percent of employees in auto part plants but the 
Auto Lite’s workforce was, according to one estimate, about 72 to 73 percent female. 21 
Furthermore management’s use of gender discrimination over job assignment divided 
production into “woman’s work” and “men’s work” concentrating them into different 
departments within the plant where under the piecework system the latter got a higher base 
rate of pay.22 Thus any successful effort to organize the plant would require attracting the 
women as well as the men into the union.  
But uncertainty was at the heart of the initial effort to unionize the Auto Lite Factory. 
Few of the workers in the factory had any experience with labor unions including the group 
of punch press operators of Department Two where organizing began around the fall of 1933. 
Furthermore, Auto Lite management had thoroughly inculcated an atmosphere of fear 
towards union membership among much of its work force. Many of the punch press 
operators were initially scared to get involved in union activity because, as one of them put it, 
they “knew that if [they] did anything in the shop that [they’d] get fired one by one so fast.”23 
But with the encouragement of Charles Rigby, a punch press operator and lead organizer, and 
                                                 
21John Barnard, American Vanguard : the United Auto Workers during the Reuther years (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press),  24; Phillip A. Korth and Margaret R. Beegle, I Remember Like Today (Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 1988), 56. 
22 Phillip A. Korth and Margaret R. Beegle, I Remember Like Today (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1988), 56, 63. 
23 Ibid, 74 
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section 7(a) of NIRA which seemingly cemented their right to organize and collectively 
bargain, five of these workers met regularly, in secret, to discuss forming a union. After 
contacting officials from the Toledo Central Labor Union, these five individuals signed 
membership cards for the newly formed FLU local #18384. They then covertly spread the 
word and signed up the rest of the approximately one hundred employees of their 
department.  The women in Department Two, Charlie Rigby recalled, were especially eager 
to join the union because they were “just so mad [about their working conditions] that they’d 
done anything.”24 They subsequently elected a shop committee with Rigby as their chairman 
to meet with management. Despite the quick progress the union had made within the plant, 
there was little chance that Auto Lite management would listen to their demands. At their 
first meeting, Arthur Minch, the vice president of the company threatened the shop 
committee that they had “at least a million dollars to break [their] union.” This first encounter 
was an early indicator of the extremes that the Auto Lite company was prepared to go to 
avoid recognizing, negotiating with, or even signing a contract with an independent labor 
union. Thus an initial display of union strength was needed to change management’s 
intransigent position.   
The First Strike 
By February of 1934, Local #18384 had a relatively solid base of membership as a 
result of the organizing that took place at the various auto-part companies in Toledo. They 
even had a signed contract with City Auto Stamping (“the most completely organized” at the 
time) that included union recognition, a substantial wage increase, seniority rights and an 8 
                                                 
24 Ibid, 217. 
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hour work day.25 Following the actions of Spicer Manufacturing Company’s president 
Charles A. Dana to arrange a company union within their plant, the local planned walk outs 
at the Logan Gear Company, the Bingham Stamping and Tool Company, as well as at the 
Auto Lite Company to get them to accept a uniform agreement for a ten percent wage 
increase, seniority, union recognition, and equal pay for women for equal work.26When these 
demands were rejected by the companies, the Local 18384 went out on strike beginning on 
February 23, 1934 for five days bringing 3600 workers out of the factories. 27 
 In the Electric Auto Lite factory, with only one department organized and an apparent 
intransigent position of management against recognizing their union, the organizers were 
anxious to integrate their members into the upcoming strike. Rigby convinced the local’s 
business agent Tom Ramsey that even though their whole factory wasn’t organized yet, if 
their department was shutdown the rest of the factory wouldn’t be able to produce.28 As a 
result, Rigby brought the Auto Lite’s union nucleus into a united front with the workers from 
Spicer, Bingham and Logan for a shared agreement from their respective employers. But the 
Auto Lite workers that actually walked out represented only a fraction of those on strike 
during this time. Roughly fifteen workers there walked out and manned their picket line 
along with fifty others, mainly outside of Department Two, who just stayed at home.29 
 Both the amalgamated structure of Local #18384 as well as sympathy of other 
AFL trade unions contributed to the partial success of the strike, especially for the Auto Lite 
                                                 
25 Addes, interview by Skeel, June 25, 1960, p. 5, UAW Oral History Collection; Letter from Thomas Ramsey 
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members. With few people participating in the walk out from the Auto Lite plant, Spicer 
workers reinforced their effort by providing support to maintain their picket line. The Spicer 
employees composed the largest proportion of the local’s strike with about 2000 walking 
out.30 They provided Auto Lite workers with supplies such as coal to make fire for warmth 
and tents to allow them to keep a presence outside of the factory.31 The other AFL trade 
union locals including the International Association of Machinists (I.A.M) and the 
International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths, Drop Forgers and Helpers as well as the 
independent union Mechanics Educational Society of America (M.E.S.A) walked out 
alongside the FLU local in these factories. The railroad unions, in sympathy with the strike, 
refused to carry goods into the Auto Lite yard, forcing the company to haul goods in by 
truck. A Federal conciliator, Hugh D. Friel, helped negotiate a temporary agreement which 
he convinced the FLU local to accept and end the strike on February 28th. But it was not 
without prodding from employees of the Spicer plant, the only shop that had shut down their 
plant, who successfully demanded that the Auto-Lite strikers be included or they wouldn’t 
return to work. 32 Furthermore, the support from other AFL trade unions during the first strike 
within these factories foreshadowed the broader support that built up among organized labor 
in Toledo during the second strike. 
Despite their initial strong interest in Department Two, no female Auto Lite workers 
participated in the walk out. Though there were women workers that “were 100 percent” 
union supporters, they remained “sympathizers after work.” These female Auto Lite 
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employees brought food after work to the homes of those who were picketing.33 The fear of 
repercussions (including being replaced) for openly participating in union activity was a main 
factor for such covert support among women workers as it was for many other workers in the 
Auto Lite plant. That initial hesitancy towards open union participation among female Auto 
Lite workers may also have been a result of the gender origins of the union within the plant. 
The core male organizers that formed the union nucleus within the plant from Department 
Two emerged because, as one of them put it they “knew that [they] could trust one another” 
in the face of management hostility and company spies.34 This group, which they 
affectionately referred to themselves as “the unholy thirteen,” may have been an additional 
obstacle to female involvement in union activities as outsiders to that male social circle. 35 
George Addes, then the financial secretary of the local, claimed that Auto Lite was initially a 
difficult plant to organize because of its sizeable female workforce since “women seemed to 
feel that a union was an organization for men.”36  It was that tie amongst the “unholy 
thirteen” which, in part gave them the courage to participate in the walk out along with two 
additional sympathizers and walk the picket line. That gender dynamic shaped the 
subsequent large scale organizing drive once the first strike was settled within the plant. 
According to an office worker within the Auto Lite plant who later became an active member 
of the local, during this time, “men responded first” and the departments “where they had 
almost 100 percent female help” were “some of the last that were organized.”37 Though the 
male-oriented origins of the local within the Auto Lite may have been an initial obstacle to 
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female involvement, once the union got on its feet following the small victory of the first 
strike, women would take on a crucial role in ensuring its firm establishment through the 
second strike. 
Though the walkout ended in a settlement that fell far short of what the local was 
demanding, the strike strengthened the local’s position within each of the shops that had 
participated. This was especially true in the Auto Lite factory. Even with an initial limited 
organized presence and participation in the strike, the event allowed the union to gain further 
traction and legitimacy among the workers by producing a tangible, though incomplete 
victory. The settlement created a truce which reinstated all striking workers, provided an 
immediate five percent wage increase for each shop, and a thirty day period for shop floor 
negotiations between the local and the companies by April 1st. Thus, as a result, the FLU 
local was, in the words of one of the Auto Lite organizers, able to get their “foot in the 
doorway as the union…[but] just [their] toes in [at] the Auto Lite.”38  The Auto Lite shop 
committee subsequently organized most of the Auto-Lite factory into the local union and in 
turn emboldened them to demand more from the company.  
Second Strike and the formation of the picket line 
The settlement that came out of the first strike had only a limited impact on Auto Lite 
management’s hostile stance toward organized labor within the plant. They continually 
refused to bargain with the local’s shop committee headed by Charlie Rigby as well Tom 
Ramsey, the local’s business agent. At the same time, while the local was organizing more 
and more workers there, management hired new workers and secretly purchased over 
$12,000 worth of tear gas and arms in preparation for another potential strike.39  
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On April 13, 1934, as attempts at negotiation with Auto Lite management continued 
to fail, 400 workers walked out of the plant. Bingham workers had gone on strike on April 
11th and Logan Gear employees followed on April 17th.  Despite the fact that the walkouts at 
each site attracted significant number of workers, all of these factories remained in 
production and hired strikebreakers. At the Auto Lite plant, 400 of the 1700 workers came 
out on strike. A leadership group of about twenty five FLU local members, the most active 
individuals, formed the core of the subsequent Auto Lite factory picket line.40 Within this 
core, captains were designated to serve as leaders of the picket in effort to coordinate the 
picket line. The local had plenty of other volunteers to reinforce the picket line “from all the 
different plants in Toledo.” 41  In addition to sympathizers from within the FLU local, those 
formerly employed at the Auto Lite plant as well as left wing groups including, most 
prevalently, the Lucas County Unemployed League (LCUL) led by Sam Pollock and Ted 
Seleander reinforced the picket line.   By April 17th, Auto Lite vice president Arthur Minch 
complained in court about the presence of the LCUL who had gathered “more than nine 
hundred men lined six deep on the sidewalks” in front of the plant.42  
The LCUL, unlike the other left wing groups that tried to get involved in the strike, 
had ties with those in the FLU local at the time. Formed in July 1933 as an organizing arm of 
the Conference for Progressive Labor Action (CPLA), which subsequently became the 
American Workers Party, the National Unemployed League (NUL) emerged as a militant 
organization for the jobless.  In Toledo five months later, Seleander and Pollock founded the 
LCUL which fought for better treatment for the unemployed through direct action efforts to 
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gain improvements in the city’s relief system.43 Such activity brought it into close contact 
with Toledo organized labor. As Pollock wrote many years later, during that time “the 
constant shifting of employed into unemployment and the reverse established a close bond” 
between the two groups, both in Toledo as well as other locations that NUL existed.44 
Moreover, LCUL also organized the jobless to support the strikes of employed workers.45 
Within the FLU local, James Roland, a trustee on the executive committee was the main 
liaison between the LCUL and the auto union. An ex-employee at the Toledo Chevrolet plant 
at the time when he was fired in March, 1934 for union activity, Roland joined the LCUL 
after he met Pollock and Seleander at the welfare offices. With an interest in doing “anything 
that would help the underdog,” he became quite active in LCUL.46 Pollock also had a tie to 
the auto union as an organizer for FLU local #18384 in 1933 when he worked at Logan Gear 
Company as a part time bookkeeper. But he was subsequently fired and blacklisted when he 
was caught by supervisors carrying union membership applications.47 
 The second strike saw female workers expand in their involvement and role in union 
activity. Female workers from the Auto Lite factory served as a particularly outspoken, 
fearless and aggressive element of the picket line. The union’s previous success in 
challenging Auto Lite following the first walk out provided them with the encouragement to 
fight for their right as workers. As John Jankowski, an Auto lite organizer, put it when the 
walk out in April came, “women were more active in some spots [on the picket line] than the 
men” because “they knew they had a backing.”  Up until then the female workers “were all 
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quiet and just looking over their shoulder and watching.”48 According to one striking 
worker’s estimate, there were more women on the picket line than men. As the strike 
progressed, as one female Auto Lite production worker observed from her time within the 
factory during the walkout, more and more joined the picket line.49  
  Women, both the striking workers as well as wives of those picketing and of union 
leaders, became an important linchpin between the picket line and the community. The 
community orientation of the union, in addition to their hardships within the Auto Lite 
workplace, may account for women’s fervent involvement in the strike. As Faue argues in 
Community of Suffering & Struggle a major factor in determining women’s participation in 
the labor movement has been the level in which it was rooted in the community.50 The Auto 
Lite workforce was mainly Polish who lived in the same neighborhoods together. As a 
Toledo policeman on patrol during the strike observed, around 75 percent of the working 
population lived in a neighborhood together north of Cherry Street. The community-based 
identity of the union brought out whole families and friends to bolster and support the picket 
line, especially once civil disobedience against the court-ordered picketing restriction moved 
into action. 51 On the picket line, they engaged in an array of activities to support the strike 
effort including signing up workers for union membership, cutting and supplying wood for 
fires. 52 Women also set up soup kitchens in the union hall to provide meals for the striking 
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workers. Even when the violence broke out later on in the strike, as one picketer admitted, 
the women “fought just as hard” as the men.53 
The Injunction suit and resistance 
 On April 17th, Auto Lite Company, following incidents of violence between strikers 
and strikebreakers on the picket line, turned to the courts in an attempt to put a legal 
stranglehold on the FLU local and its strike with an injunction suit.54 Several judges passed 
over this suit before Judge Stuart who, as one prominent lawyer in Toledo described him, 
was an “old Republican warhorse” and a “drunkard” who was “totally committed to the [pro-
business] Republican hierarchy” of the Toledo judicial system took up the case.55 Stuart 
immediately declared a restriction on picketing to no more than fifty people at the Auto Lite 
plant, twenty five at the Bingham plant and prohibited picketing by nonunion personnel 
which explicitly excluded the Socialist Party, the Lucas County Unemployed Council (a 
Communist led organization), and the Lucas County Unemployed League. A long court 
battle ensued between the FLU local and the Auto Lite Company over the potential 
injunction. The AFL as well as the Toledo Central Labor Union were brought in to provide 
legal assistance. With the Toledo police, many of them sympathetic to the strike, unwilling to 
disperse the strikers and enforce the restriction, Lucas County Sheriff David Krieger 
appointed 150 deputies (non of which had police experience), paid and supplied by the Auto 
Lite Company to disperse the strike.56 
As the prospects for a successful FLU Local’s walkout waned by early May, 
disillusionment among the strikers with their union leadership set in. Ramsey’s decision to 
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comply with the restrictions on picketing and to turn to the court room to fight the Auto Lite 
company’s suit and arbitration through the Automobile Labor Board (which the company 
rejected) demoralized members of the FLU locals. Such actions had reduced the picket line 
to the point “where they would be lucky if there was one or two picketing.” 57 Thus the Auto 
Lite employment office remained open and the company brought in 1800 new workers. 
Moreover on May 7th, MESA, whose 62 members controlled the tool and die room in the 
Auto Lite plant, returned to work after walking out with the FLU local when management 
threatened to move the die shop out of town. This threat along with the hopeless condition of 
the strike at this point led MESA president Chapman to admit that they “[felt]…that the 
strike [was] lost.”58  
This devastating decline in the prospects for the striking workers prompted a group of 
FLU local members to take action. These “progressives” (who among them was James 
Roland) sought to take the situation into their own hands with a desire to use more aggressive 
and militant action in order to win the strike. As Roland put it, they felt that they “had to do it 
on the bottom” to fight not only the company during the second strike but also “reactionary 
labor leaders” like Ramsey and Floyd Bossler (FLU local #18384 president) who as the 
official conductors of the effort had allowed the walk out to deteriorate as well as the 
indifferent national AFL leadership that “didn’t none of [those people] help” them.59 
Subsequently, this group of FLU local members, most likely on the suggestion of James 
Roland, turned to the Unemployed League when “several Auto Lite stewards and members 
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of the local” visited their offices.60 Then, during a meeting of 25-30 individuals from the 
FLU local explicitly excluding Ramsey, James Roland, along with  two people from the Auto 
Lite Factory, (Earl Stucker and Norman Myers), and Sam Pollock and Ted Seleander, took 
on the leadership of the strike. They formed the LCUL anti-injunction committee and 
planned to purposefully break the court-ordered restriction on picketing.61 Louis Budenz, the 
executive secretary of the American Workers Party and an experienced strike leader, whom 
Pollock later described as “one of the best strike strategists on the labor scene,” had been in 
constant contact with Pollock and Selander at that time.62 Before the meeting of the LCUL 
and the union members,  Budenz wrote to the LCUL leaders urging them to purposefully 
violate the injunction claiming that such an act would be “the deed that [would] set off the 
fireworks” to win the strike.63 This decision would be a turning point in this labor struggle. 
Those involved in this plan knew what was at stake as Roland noted that if it wasn’t “a 
winning strike the labor movement would be set back quite a few years in Toledo.”64  
Charles Rigby, who spoke at that meeting, expressed the militant sentiments of those there 
asserting that he was “a law-abiding citizen” but they were “going to break this injunction” 
because they “haven’t anything to lose; [they have] got it all to gain now.”65 The desperation 
in face of the possibility of losing this strike had agitated these union members alongside the 
radical Unemployment League to take civil disobedient direct action. That meeting set into 
motion the subsequent defiance of the strike injunction as well as increasing the American 
Worker Party’s influence within the FLU local.  
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The effort to intentionally violate and break the court-ordered picket restrictions 
became a rallying point for community support of the second strike for it revived mass 
picketing. On May 5th, in a public letter to written Judge Stuart which explained their 
decision to violate the injunction, Pollock and Seleander jumpstarted the initiative towards 
militant direct action. Two days later, alongside Norman Myers and Carl Leck, both 
members of the FLU local, Pollock and Seleander, carried out their act of defiance. Pollock 
and Seleander held a sign that read “Unemployed League Violates Injunction” announcing 
their civil disobedience while the union members had one that read “Violate Court 
Intervention with Mass Picketing.”66 They were arrested for contempt of court but let out on 
bail provided by Ed Lamb, their attorney.67 Upon release, they returned to the picket lines 
with more union members. By May 11th, the picket line had swelled to over a hundred.  On 
May 14th, Judge Stuart issued a temporary injunction against mass picketing and restraining 
certain nonunion individuals, and he then issued a permanent one on the next day.68 But 
enforcement of that measure proved difficult in the face of an energized opposition. Arrests 
continued on the picket line with 107 picketers arrested on May 15th and 46 more on the next 
day.69 By then, even Thomas Ramsey, though he’d been officially critical of the role of 
outside groups in the strike, had turned against the court by calling for mass picketing in spite 
of Stuart’s decision.70  But the city couldn’t continue to engage in mass arrests because of the 
costs it entailed. Sheriff Krieger informed Judge Stuart that he was reluctant to continue 
arresting violators because they would destroy jail property and were too costly to feed.71  
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Moreover, the courthouse became a public forum for those arrested for violating the 
injunction to mobilize mass support for the strikers as well as for various left wing groups. 
On May 11th Pollock and Seleander aimed to turn the first trial stemming from their arrest on 
May 7th into “a showdown fight” for the “indictment of capitalism and capitalist courts.” On 
the day before the trial, they organized a mass demonstration outside the courthouse during 
which Seleander spoke of the need to break the court-ordered restrictions on mass picketing. 
During the trial, with a courtroom “jammed with workers,” both Seleander and Pollock 
turned their case into a stage for grandstanding to appeal to the working class audience. The 
questions directed to each of them became moments to give speeches denouncing various 
things including wage-cutting, unemployment, and capitalist courts. Despite being found 
guilty, the four violators had their sentences suspended based on “misconceptions” of the 
points of the injunction.72 Subsequent trials over violations of the picketing restrictions were 
scenes of mass demonstrations where workers and strike sympathizers packed the courthouse 
as well as crowded outside. On May 18th Judge Stuart faced resistance when he tried to 
prosecute a contempt case against only twenty four of the forty six arrested, including the 
five leaders. Before the trial, those arrested held a meeting in the jail and refused to let only 
some of their numbers stand trial, chanting a slogan “forty six or nothing.”73 In the courtroom 
filled with hundreds of union members and sympathizers, after Ed Lamb, the lawyer for the 
picketers, insisted that all the defendants be tried together, the chant “46 or none” broke out. 
Eventually a heated argument broke out between the strikers and the Auto Lite attorneys. 
Pollock and Seleander (who were again among those standing trial) were arrested again in 
contempt of court for disrupting their own trial. In response, the crowd, in Lamb’s words, 
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“lifted [Pollock and Seleander] to their shoulders and bore them off as heroes” out of the 
courtroom.74 Such disregard for the court was in part because of Judge Stuart’s behavior. 
Judge Stuart, a well known alcoholic, “fortified himself” for the court sessions for the 
prosecution of injunction violators with a bottle of whiskey.75 Such conduct, in addition to 
picket restraining order, gave further ammunition to Pollock and Seleander’s denunciation of 
the “capitalist court” and its lack of concern for the rights of workers and the issue of union 
recognition. By late May, other leftist leaders, including A.J. Muste and Louis Budenz as 
well as those from the Communist party and its Unemployed Council, had gotten into the 
action by trying to get arrested, attain prominence and “become a leader of the working class 
of America.”76 The aggressive thrust to violate and break the court restraining order on 
picketing through mass mobilization both on the picket line as well as in the courthouse 
ensured that, in Lamb’s words, “nothing was settled by the injunction.”77 This meant that the 
Auto Lite company couldn’t legally put down the strike through the local court system. 
Furthermore, the turn to direct action to violate the injunction galvanized the broader 
community in Toledo. At the time, as one person put it, “Toledo was going wild in union 
recognition” as many people got behind the striking workers.78  On May 21- May 23, crowds 
of up to 6,000 people gathered on picket line in front of the Auto lite plant to hear speakers 
from the American Workers party, including Louis Budenz as well as the FLU local. An 
important reason for this up swell of support was that the president of the Auto Lite 
company, Clement O. Miniger, was a very unpopular man in the city because of his banking 
connections. As the director of the Ohio Bank and a leading shareholder in both the Ohio and 
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the Security-Home banks, Miniger was “an important symbol of the city’s financial 
oligarchy.” Though these Toledo financial institutions were among the largest to collapse in 
1931 taking millions of dollars worth of deposits with them and triggering the Great 
Depression in the city, Miniger and his Auto Lite Company were able to withdraw their own 
savings on the last day of their operation. 79A popular sign on the Auto Lite plant picket line 
explicitly points to the criminality of Miniger’s involvement in Toledo’s banking mishaps 
asserting “We Don’t Need Dillinger [a notorious bank robber at the time]—We Have 
Miniger.” Budenz, fully aware of this sentiment, in his first speech in front of the Auto Lite 
plant, on May 21, labeled Miniger “Toledo’s Public Enemy No. 1.” He later wrote that 
“nothing [else like that designation] evoked such [a] community response.”80 
More importantly, in terms of the role of the community during this time, many 
people within Toledo were aware of the broader importance of the Auto Lite strike. Some 
that came out to the picket line were there just to observe the spectacle taking place. But 
others, like  John Toczynski, a resident in Toledo during the second strike, came to support 
the picket line after work because they felt that they “were all fighting for a cause…the 
working man’s cause” since “it was about time that the working man had something going 
his way, instead of always the other way.”81 These strike sympathizers were people both 
employed and unemployed as Margaret Byrd, a wife of an Auto Lite organizer, noted “that 
had worked and didn’t get fair play [and] should have had more money.” 82 The union 
struggle became a working class struggle in Toledo. The Auto Lite Company and its 
President became the symbol of the entrenched business elite in Toledo. By overcoming the 
                                                 
79 Banksters, Bosses, and Smart Money,  p. 145. 
80 “Sequence of Events in Toledo Battle,” Labor Action, p. 3, June 1, 1934, “For an American Revolutionary 
Approach,” Louis Budenz, p. 17, The Modern Monthly 
81 I Remember Like Today, p. 120. 
82 I Remember Like Today, p.163&164. 
34  
company’s opposition to the union in the courts through an energized partnership between a 
group of FLU local rank and file and the LCUL, the fight had transformed into what Budenz 
later called a “community uprising” against the hegemony of Toledo business elites who had, 
since the Overland Strike of 1919, dominated and dictated much of the city’s economy.83 
Though the left wing elements became an influential part of the second strike, they 
weren’t fully accepted by some within the local. During the first walk-out, according to a 
letter that a worker in the Spicer plant wrote to AFL President William Green, “Communists” 
tried to “horn in” and gain influence over the strike but with a “strong, intelligent shop 
committee” and local officers that were “honest, level headed and fair-minded men” such 
efforts “did not stand a chance in the world.”84 In the second strike, though there were 
various kinds of left wing groups that came, most workers on the picket line saw little 
distinction between them, clumping all those outsiders as “communists.”85 On the executive 
committee of the local there were those suspicious of these “communists” as one member put 
it, though “they always acted like they were 100 percent for the union…but their main 
purpose was organization for Communist purposes” so “that’s why…Local 18384 wouldn’t 
have nothing to do with them at all.”86 According to that executive committee member, if the 
local found any members or officers belonging to or even close to a Communist organization 
“they would get rid of them in a hurry.”87 Thomas Ramsey, the business agent and nominally 
in charge of the second strike, was also critical of the presence of the left wing forces in the 
local. During the injunction suit hearing, Ramsey blamed the violence taking place on the 
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picket line on “those damn communists.”88 Among the organizers in the Auto Lite shop 
committee some were uneasy with the presence of the “communists” namely Selander and 
Pollock especially as they were perceived as “anti-religion.”89    
The Battle of Toledo 
Despite this large community support for the striking workers, the company remained 
determined to break the strike. The Merchants and Manufacturers Association as well as 
various leaders in the automobile industry gave their support for the company’s anti-union 
stance. The latter group advised Miniger that they would “back him to the limit in his 
defiance of labor unions” which indicated the broader significance these powerful business 
figures attached to the potential outcome of this strike within the auto industry.90 During that 
three day period, the company hastily added to their supply of arms with $11,000 worth of 
munitions and augmented Krieger’s force of special deputies with additional Auto Lite 
workers who had either stayed at work or had been recently hired.91 Then on May 23rd, the 
day after a clash between picketers and strikebreakers had broken out, with encouragement 
from the Auto Lite company to enforce the injunction more energetically, Sheriff Krieger 
“decided to take the offensive” in dispersing the picket line with deputies stationed on the 
roof and in front of the plant. After a woman on the picket line was hit with a steel rod tossed 
from the plant, violence broke out between the picketers and the deputies as the pickets 
surged forward in outrage and attempted to storm the plant to attack the person who threw it. 
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The deputies on the factory roof responded with a barrage of tear gas bombs and those in 
front armed with clubs and iron bars unleashed fire hoses on the crowd. 92  
Pushed back across the street from the factory, the pickets were now determined to 
halt production in the Auto Lite plant by surrounding it and refusing to let the strikebreakers 
leave. The sheriff’s act had not only strengthened the resolve of those on the picket line but it 
brought out more sympathizers to reinforce their numbers. As one of the Auto Lite 
organizers put it, once Krieger had brought out the tear gas “all of Toledo started gathering 
from all these other factories” especially from Spicer and Willys Overland as well as the 
unemployed which was “where [they] got [their] help, [their] sympathy,” from these people 
“that didn’t even think of a union.”93 The next day, May 24th, when Ohio governor George 
White called out the national guard to disperse the picket line and escort those in the plant 
home, the soldiers, all quite young, were met with a hostile crowd. Resenting their presence, 
people on the picket line began hurling insults at the soldiers, and rocks and bricks soon 
followed. From then until May 26th, the “Battle of Chestnut Hill” raged outside the plant in a 
series of clashes between the guardsmen and the picket line as each charged on one another. 
The outcome, which marked the climax of the second strike, was many wounded and one 
person on the picket line killed after a guardsman opened fire on the crowd. With all the 
workers brought out of the plant, Auto Lite production was effectively shut down and direct 
negotiations between the company and the union, under the aegis of federal mediators, 
began. Finally on May 31 after several days of negotiation, an agreement emerged between 
the union and the Auto Lite management and subsequently ratified on June 4th. 94 
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The General Strike and Toledo Organized Labor 
Paralleling the renewed militancy on the picket line in early May in face of the court-
ordered restrictions was the growth of support from Toledo organized labor through the 
Toledo Central Labor Union (TCLU). As an AFL labor body, described by A.J Muste as 
“less reactionary and bureaucratized” than similar ones in other cities “but not in the remotest 
sense ‘Red’” the TCLU became increasingly energized by the developing strike.95 On May 
3rd, the TCLU adopted the recommendations of its committee of twenty-three, which 
represented all the affiliated craft and trade unions in the city, instructing union members not 
to cross the strikers’ picket lines, protesting the restraining order against mass picketing and 
the possibility of a general strike to protect trade union interests in the city. The editorial 
written in The Union Leader, on the following day, the official newspaper of the Toledo 
Central Labor Union reflected a new sense of urgency and militancy with the TCLU. As “an 
appeal to all workers, employed and unemployed, union and non-union” the editorial 
interpreted the restraining order on picketing as an act of class warfare for which “the so-
called partnership between capital and labor has broken down” if it ever existed. The 
injunction was seen as a larger effort among “the employing class of Toledo” for “making a 
final desperate fight to eliminate organized labor” despite their legal standing under the 
NRA. These employers, like Auto Lite management, had sought to divide workers by 
encouraging “strikebreaking and violence and then through the press, place the blame on the 
strikers.” Workers, then, must respond with a united front forgetting “all minor differences 
and fight concertedly…for the right of labor to organize and have such organizations 
recognized” in order to “advance the cause of [their] class, the working class.”96 More 
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specifically, leaders within the Toledo Central Labor Union felt that the city’s Chamber of 
Commerce and Merchants and Manufacturers Associations, with their long history of brutal 
union busting, were the main culprits behind this initiative “to have a temporary and later a 
permanent injunction served on the trade union movement in Toledo.” 97 
By May 15th as the struggle in the courts continued over the legal injunction as well 
as clashes on the picket line, talks emerged in the Toledo Central Labor Union over whether 
to declare a general strike to achieve a settlement at the Auto Lite plant. Toledo Central 
Labor Union utilized its committee of twenty-three, which had been appointed to generate 
funds for the striking workers, to take a general strike vote with the locals affiliated with the 
CLU. By May 31, an overwhelming number of unions, around 95 of the 103 unions, had 
voted in favor of a general strike.98 AFL President Green, who didn’t support the strike from 
the beginning, responded to this sentiment with great disdain. He saw the leaders of the 
Toledo CLU as individuals “to counsel and advise with the workers [in the city] regarding 
strike action and to use [their] influence to prevent strike action at a time when conditions 
were unfavorable.” Though the provocative acts of the Auto Lite management “may be very 
great” the workers should “exercise good judgment” in this situation because a general strike, 
in Green’s opinion, should not be carried out “except under the most grave circumstances 
and conditions.” Since the Toledo CLU wasn’t playing the conservative voice that Green 
wanted in this situation, he sent Coleman Claherty, an AFL organizer from Akron, Ohio, to 
go to Toledo to serve as an advisor because it was clear to him “there [was] need for wise 
                                                 
97 Letter from Otto Brach to Frank Morrison, May 4th, 1934, American Federation of Labor records of FLU 
local 18384 (on microfilm at the University of Michigan) 
98 The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle, 280 
39  
counsel and the exercise of good judgment.”99 Otto Brach, the Toledo CLU’s secretary, 
responded to Green by arguing that the local “conditions here [were] desperate” to stop “the 
constant onslaught of the employers in the court” and that “no one being away from this city 
can even comprehend the activities of the united Merchants and Manufacturers’ Association” 
in Toledo.100 The general strike was the only weapon that Toledo’s organized labor had to 
finally assert its own strength and position within the city’s economy. The union leaders 
within the Toledo Central Union were older men, particularly those in the building trades 
who had long memories of the city’s open shop campaigns of the 1920s, beginning with the 
defeat in the Overland strike of 1919, under the aegis of the Merchants and Manufacturers’ 
Association.101 Thus the local circumstances and history in Toledo trumped the cautious and 
conservative nature of AFL trade unionism to rally the city’s organized labor around Local 
#18384’s strike effort.  
Talk of general strike within the Toledo CLU led to a parade on June 1 of Toledo 
trade unions with over 12,000 members participating which was, according to Otto Brach, 
“one of the largest parades ever held in this city.” At the subsequent mass meeting in the 
courthouse square, 25,000-30,000 people came to hear various speakers. The large 
attendance at this event demonstrated to the leaders within the Toledo CLU “the solidarity of 
[the labor] movement in [Toledo]…which will have a decided effect upon any future 
controversies” pushing the city’s labor movement forward “more rapidly than ever 
                                                 
99 Letter from William Green to Otto Brach, May 17th, 1934, American Federation of Labor records of FLU 
local 18384 (on microfilm at the University of Michigan) 
100 Letter from Otto Brach to William Green, May 23, 1934, American Federation of Labor records of FLU 
local 18384 (on microfilm at the University of Michigan) 
101 Roland, interview by Skeels, Sept. 25, 1960,p. 7&8 UAW Oral History Collection; I Remember Like Today,  
119  
40  
before.”102 Yet the mass meeting also indicated the gap between leadership and the rank and 
file over the general strike issue. Among those invited to speak at this event was A.J. Muste, 
the radical preacher and head of the American Workers Party, who was quite adamant about 
the need for a general strike at the time to force an agreement in the Auto Lite plant. But right 
before the parade, he was notified that he wouldn’t be called upon to speak at the mass 
meeting. Those who did speak at the event stayed away from talk of a potential general 
strike.  However, as Muste observed, “the crowd [at the mass meeting] quickly demonstrated 
that the general strike was the one thing in which it was interested” and bombarded the 
speakers with questions about it, but the leaders of the meeting had no answers. Eventually, 
the uproar in the crowd over this issue threw “the meeting…into turmoil” and most of the 
Toledo CLU leaders walked out. At that moment, Sam Pollock and other individuals from 
American Worker Party took control of the meeting and called on the crowd for a general 
strike that Monday unless there was a settlement of the Auto Lite Strike. 103 Thus whether an 
actual general strike, despite the Toledo CLU’s rhetoric, would have been called was 
uncertain.  But the manner in which the second strike became a focal point for the Toledo 
labor movement to get behind as part of a larger effort to entrench unionism in the city’s 
economy heightened the importance of a final settlement at the Auto Lite plant.  
 
Conclusion 
 FLU local #18384 victory in the second Auto Lite strike successfully defied business 
elite’s unquestioned control over the city’s political economy. Triggering that final outcome 
was the decision from a segment of the members within the local, in conjunction with the 
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LCUL, to defy not only the city’s court system, of which had been a successful means of 
breaking a strike in Toledo in the past, but their own union leadership that had complied with 
its restraining order. In the process they were able mobilize sympathizers to take part in mass 
demonstrations in the courtrooms and on the picket line to expand the struggle towards the 
broader community and effectively break the injunction. The subsequent attacks on the 
growing crowd outside the plant instigated by Sheriff Krieger and his special deputies with 
tear gas and hoses reinforced resolve of many out there and expanded their support. The 
subsequent siege of the Auto Lite plant and the clashes with the National Guard 
demonstrated the anger and frustration among those on the picket line that had grown in this 
struggle that seemed to have no end. But after these violent series of events, negotiations 
began between the company and the union from which came final contract. During that same 
period the growing sentiment within the TCLU for a general strike paralleled the broadening 
mass support for the Auto Lite strike. 
 This group of rank and file, the “progressives,” would continue to extend its influence 
within the local in connection with the LCUL and the American Workers Party. But the 
hostility of some towards the left wing presence during the Auto Lite strike ensured that the 
emergence of the progressives would create internal divisions later on. Despite such 
opposition, this progressive element would continue to be influential within the FLU local 
leading up to the 1935 Toledo Chevrolet strike. The bond between this element of the rank 
and file would be shaped both by their relationship with the left wing as well as the shared 









The year between the Auto Lite Strike of 1934 and the next major strike at the Toledo 
Chevrolet plant in 1935 was a tumultuous period for AFL FLU #18384. Internal strife 
marked the union local despite its successful organizational efforts in more auto part plants 
throughout the city. Questions over the local’s amalgamate structure, the presence of left 
wing elements, as well as financial issues created dissension within the union. During that 
time the AFL became increasingly involved in the internal functioning of the FLU local at 
the executive committee level usually at the request of those within it.  Such internal 
struggles resulted in the eventual trials of the business agent Thomas Ramsey and president 
Floyd Bossler and their subsequent expulsion from membership in the FLU local.  
Despite these internal struggles, the FLU local was able to mount a successful 
organizing drive in an atmosphere of renewed organized labor activity. By March they had 
signed contracts with three more auto part plants. With eight separate shops in the union, the 
focus turned to the Toledo Chevrolet transmission plant, their greatest challenge. Even 
though a shop committee headed by James Roland had existed within the Chevrolet factory 
(part of the mammoth General Motors Corporation) since 1933, it had remained difficult to 
organize because of management’s hostility towards union activity. But in the months 
following the Auto Lite strike, a series of events both on the shop floor and through the Auto 
Labor Board (ALB), encouraged workers at the Chevrolet plant to join the union. In late 
March 1935, an ALB announcement of an April 9th primary election to decide the collective 
bargaining agency in the Chevrolet plant put a renewed organizational drive into motion. 
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Though the union never requested the election and some suspected that Chevrolet 
management was using it as a means of voting in the company union, the elections were seen 
as an opportunity despite AFL encouragement to boycott them.  
The outcome of the election gave 65% of the 2300 votes to the FLU local. Though 
there was supposed to be a final election on April 24th, the shop committee headed by James 
Roland, didn’t wait to negotiate with management.  It formulated a contract proposal that was 
sent to management on April 16th. By April 20th, after fruitless efforts of negotiation with 
Chevrolet management, the union members in the Chevrolet plant voted to give the shop 
committee the power to call a strike for which they planned and set for April 22nd. But 
instead management reopened negotiations that day in a long session that resulted in a 
company counterproposal that conceded none of the demands of the union, the shop 
committee resumed their plan for a walkout the next day. 
April 23rd when the strike began, with the help of progressives from other plants 
within the FLU local, the Chevy workers were able to set up quickly a strong picket line that 
effectively shut down the plant. Since this Toledo plant was crucial to the national GM 
production scheme, the impact of the strike was felt across the country. The strike committee 
sought to capitalize on the national effect of their walkout by encouraging other GM FLU 
locals to participate as well by sending representatives to various locations. This effort was 
met with early success as Norwood locals joined in as well as the Cleveland local. More 
over, by April 30th they wanted to coordinate a joint national strike policy between the locals 
in order to achieve a shared agreement from GM. Moreover, to combat GM propaganda 
efforts in the local newspaper and help nationalize the walk out, the strike committee 
published Strike Truth as their bulletin to distribute to other GM FLU locals. 
44  
 But as Francis Dillon, national AFL representative in the auto industry, became 
increasingly involved in and took control of the strike, he with the support of the executive 
committee, sought to localize the walk out. He used his authority to hold back GM FLU 
locals from going on strike. Many of the GM locals wouldn’t walkout until Dillon gave them 
permission. Among those that he held back from going on strike was the union in the large 
Buick plant in Flint, Michigan. This factory was crucial in the Toledo strike committee’s plan 
to nationalize the walkout because it would’ve immediately weakened GM’s position.  
Within the local, as Dillon’s presence increased, divisions between parts of the 
executive committee and the strike committee emerged over the direction of the walkout.  
Though initially supportive of trying to get other GM FLU locals to take part in the strike, as 
the strike committee continued to advance this national aim, the executive committee 
curtailed its efforts. Moreover, the executive committee attempted to withhold funds from the 
Chevy strike committee for publishing a second Strike Truth though eventually gave in. On 
the picket line, the business agent Fred Schwake excluded left wing groups from 
participating. 
Despite the detrimental effect the shut down of this Toledo plant had on the rest of its 
production, GM continued, as a matter of policy, to refuse to negotiate with the union while 
it was on strike. At the same time, the company was shifting production to other locations 
and preparing a back to work movement. The latter took the form of the Independent 
Workers Association (IWA) started by supervisors from the Toledo Chevy plant. They 
circulated a petition for a return to work based on the company’s initial proposal or, if that 
failed, a secret ballot vote of all the employees on that proposal. During a highly publicized 
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meeting on May 4th, the leaders of this organization announced that it had 1400 signatures 
though none of the FLU local members or officers were allowed entry. 
In response to the IWA Dillon, fearing the public opinion turning against the Toledo 
strikers, expanded his control over the walkout. He took the initiative to get a Federal Dept. 
of Labor administered secret ballot of the Chevy employees. Dillon did this to firmly 
establish that the union spoke for the majority opinion of employees. The outcome of the 
vote, held on May 8th, favored the union’s position as the company’s proposal was readily 
rejected. GM subsequently reversed its policy and opened formal negotiations with the 
Chevy strike committee on May 11th. During this 18 hour conference, Dillon seemed 
anxious to get an agreement regardless of the demands of the strike committee. As a result, 
the company’s proposal that came out of that session was far from desirable. Then on May 
13th, during the membership meeting to vote on the proposed agreement, Dillon was initially 
barred from speaking. After walking out and claiming that the FLU local was no longer in 
the AFL, Dillon was brought back by the executive committee and allowed to speak. The 
subsequent ballot voted in favor of the agreement and the strike came to an end. 
Through out this period, the progressive group that had emerged during the Auto Lite 
strike caused factionalism within the FLU local as it attempted to extend its influence 
through elections both on the executive board as well as on the shop committees.  This divide 
that emerged within the FLU local #18384 in the months following the Auto Lite strike 
became a strategic rift between the executive committee and the strike committee as the AFL 
exerted its own influence within the local during the Toledo Chevrolet strike. Moreover, the 
strike revealed a new impulse for national cooperation among the FLU GM locals to achieve 
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a common signed agreement with GM  - an impulse spearheaded by the Toledo strikers that 
helped advance the rank and file movement for an International UAW. 
Internal Woes 
In the aftermath of the Auto Lite strike victory, FLU local#18384 was in quite 
financial dire straits due to the various expenses that it had incurred during that long 
endeavor. By July 1934 the local had accumulated over $2000 in legal fees which left a 
balance of only about $191 in its account.1 The local thus turned to the A.F.L for financial 
support, requesting $1000 to pay its lawyer, Brandon G. Schnorf, for representing the union 
during the court injunction litigation. The FLU, as the union’s recording secretary William 
Siefke pointed out, never “asked for or received any aid from the American Federation of 
Labor” during the Auto Lite Strike. 2 As such they needed the AFL to help them in “wiping 
[their financial] slate clean.” But other issues besides financial stability were at stake in 
getting this aid from the Federation. Siefke’s letter of request pointed towards other potential 
troubles within the local “during the coming months.”3 Those problems included “keeping 
down the left-wing elements” and “stamping out criticism of the American Federation of 
Labor.”4 Such tasks may have been interrelated since the Communist Party and Workers 
Party (present during the Auto Lite Strike) had been constant critics of the AFL. 
Furthermore, such comments hinted to dissatisfaction and disdain within the executive board 
over the roles that these left wing and dissident groups had played during the Auto Lite 
strike; especially since the Musteites and Communists had provided aid and support in the 
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effort while the AFL had not. So the Federation’s contribution would give those in the local 
“a concrete example of American Federation of Labor cooperation” that would go “a long 
way in satisfying the rank and file” to stave off radical influence.5  Eventually President 
Green gave the local the requested funds. That appeal marked the first of several requests to 
the AFL for help on various internal issues from members both in the executive board and 
from the rank and file. 
Despite the AFL money given to the FLU local, finances remained a constant issue. 
One point of contention was over whether the money that Green had given to the FLU local 
was a loan or a contribution. The problem created a “serious controversy” between the union 
and their former attorney, Schnorf. AFL Secretary Frank Morrison wrote in a letter to the 
attorney that the money being disbursed to pay him was a loan, though Green had explicitly 
described it as a “financial contribution.” As a result, Siefke requested, on behalf of the FLU 
local, the AFL to send a representative to investigate the situation in Toledo.6 By October, 
more issues over union finance emerged when a member sent an appeal to Green on the 
constitutionality of an act to temporarily reduce the salaries of  the business agent and 
financial secretary and to remove the expense monies of the recording secretary and the 
president from the local pay roll. He questioned the procedure in which such measures were 
passed. Rather then respond directly to this union member, Green forwarded the letter to 
William Siefke. Siefke explained that the action was taken “due to the very deplorable 
condition of [their] local treasury.”  
As the FLU local’s financial problems emerged at the executive level, discontent 
surfaced within the union rank and file membership. The main issue was the amalgamated 
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structure (having more than one shop under a union charter) of the local. Following a 
complaint from a union member in the Spicer Company plant, William Green sent in T.N. 
Taylor, an organizer who had been present at the final negotiations of the Auto Lite strike, to 
meet with the rank and file over the question of assigning that factory a separate charter. In 
August 1934, Taylor met with about 200 members and all five of the shop committees to 
discuss this issue. In the end, the membership present at the meeting “unanimously decided” 
against giving the Spicer Company plant a separate charter and directed the members in the 
factory to focus on a “campaign of organization” to firmly establish the union there.7 Though 
several people “found some fault” with the shop committee as well as the union local 
officers, according to Taylor, “this question was ironed out in a satisfactory way to all.”8 
Despite this apparent settlement at the Spicer Company, tension remained within the 
local’s amalgamate structure. On October 31, 1934, Otto Brach, secretary at the Toledo 
Central Labor Union, reported to William Green that according to “information at hand from 
several sources” of union members within the FLU local “there [was] dissatisfaction between 
certain groups of members” which he felt would become “harmful to the organization 
itself.”9 These groups “working in different shops” in the union local were “pulling every [in] 
direction” creating harmful dissention.10 Brach recommended that each shop within the union 
should be given their own local charter. He felt that if all the auto parts plants in Toledo were 
organized under the same union local “such an organization would be unruly.”11 Brach 
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believed that such troubles within the local resulted from its multiple shops for which it 
“cannot give satisfactory service” to all of them making some members feel neglected.12  
Much of this was probably a result of the new influence that the Workers Party (what 
the American Workers Party had become after it merged with the Communist League of 
America) along side the Unemployment League had gained among some members within the 
FLU local in the months following the Auto Lite Strike. According to Art Preis, secretary of 
the Workers Party, “several of the most courageous, intelligent and active members of the” 
FLU local were “brought into the W.P.”13 These union members (such as James Roland, a 
“leader of the progressive forces,”) sought to organize a caucus within the FLU “to clean out 
the union” by weakening “the reactionary and backward influences” represented by the union 
president Floyd Bossler and business agent Tom Ramsey and to “establish the union on a 
fighting, progressive basis.”14 To do this, they ran a slate of officers for the executive board 
in their union elections that won seven of the twelve positions. Progressives were also elected 
to their various shop committees within the FLU local.15 Thus, the effort of a group of rank 
and file members to push the union in a militant direction which began during the second 
Auto Lite strike, continued in the months thereafter. 
The factionalism that had grown within FLU local #18384 surfaced on the same day 
Brach reported the issue to Green in the form of charges brought by the executive board 
against the business agent Thomas Ramsey and president Floyd Bossler. In his letter to 
William Green informing him of the charges on October 31, Siefke “knew that things were 
not so good in [their] union” a week or two before such actions were taken and had written 
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beforehand about sending Taylor to assist the union.16 The charges against Thomas Ramsey 
revolved around negligence as a business agent over handling complaints and meetings with 
members as well as his inability to return union papers and property over to the Auto Lite 
shop committee. On the other hand, the only charge against Floyd Bossler was the one 
leveled against him by Thomas Ramsey.  Ramsey claimed that Bossler tried to get him to 
“sell out the Union for $30,000.00” for which he said he “had the proof.” Two days later, 
Bossler sent an urgent telegram to Green warning the AFL president of the “bad situation” in 
the FLU local filled with “jealousy, agitation, frame-ups” which he wanted to be investigated 
because “labor interests and [his] personal reputation [were] at stake.” 17 At that time, he also 
resigned from the position of union president for which he did “this voluntary act…with no 
thought of [himself]” but rather for “the cause of labor…in Toledo” and to allow William 
Green “an opportunity to stop once and for all a lot of damn foolishness and conniving” 
within the FLU local. When Taylor came to Toledo to look into the matter, he reported, after 
speaking with members and the executive committee that the FLU local had “been held back 
for some time due to factional strife” for which “these charges are the outcome of that strife.” 
On November 3rd, the executive board put Ramsey and Bossler on trial and found both guilty 
on all charges, the latter only because he failed to attend the trial.18 Ramsey subsequently 
appealed to the body of union membership, and at a regular meeting on November 23rd the 
membership failed to uphold the decision in a vote (167 to 91) that fell short of a two thirds 
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majority. At that same meeting, the union membership upheld the executive committee’s 
recommendation to expel Bossler from union membership. The day following the vote, an 
appeal to overturn the rank and file decision was sent to Green signed by several members of 
the local “including most of the executives.” 19   
Unlike Ramsey who eventually resigned as business agent, Bossler sought to fight the 
charges. He responded to these actions by the executive committee with an appeal to William 
Green. He was exercising “the right guaranteed [him] under the constitution of” the AFL “to 
appeal the acts or findings of the Executive Committee of [his] Local.”20 He claimed that he 
“was so firmly convinced” that he wouldn’t get a fair hearing from the executive board 
because of “his long association with [its] members” that he didn’t show up to the trial.21 He 
accompanied this appeal with a letter defending himself to the AFL President and thoroughly 
questioning Tom Ramsey’s character with multiple points about various past incidents which 
were “well-known” to the executive committee.22 To substantiate these claims, he listed 
several union members as witnesses, many of which were the militant organizers from the 
Auto Lite Company plant including Charlie Rigby, Norman Myer and Lester Byrd. Such an 
appeal was presented “not as a defense, but with a view of helping my Union and the 
members whom I served.”23 
Yet Bossler never got that hearing before the AFL Executive Board. At first he “was 
opposed to jeopardizing the interests of labor” by turning to the court and the local press “to 
protect [his] name and character.”24 Even with the desire to keep this issue private, he 
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questioned if President Green was “cognizant of the seriousness of the entire situation here” 
in FLU Local #18384.25 But by December 4th, Bossler became increasingly frustrated with 
the way the AFL was handling the controversy in the FLU Local. On the national level 
President Green and his secretary Frank Morrison continued to ignore his request. The 
members within the FLU local, according to Bossler, had “been kept in the dark” to certain 
information pertaining to the factionalism brewing within the executive committee, including 
the terms of his resignation as well as his own defense.26 With those avenues of appeal 
seemingly cut off to him, Bossler turned to the local press to advocate his case. He felt that 
unless the AFL “wish[ed] to assume full responsibility in settling this case” it was his duty 
“to protect the members of the union and [his] own reputation by using” the information he 
had “in any way [he saw] fit.” 27  
Despite these efforts to get the AFL to focus on resolving the controversy within the 
FLU Local, Bossler continued to get the cold shoulder. Francis Dillon, the general organizer 
and national representative of the AFL in the auto industry, had recently taken over the 
position on October 15, 1934 from William Collins, and served as the mediator in the 
situation between the FLU local and President Green.28 He was mainly responsible for 
ensuring that Bossler’s appeal wouldn’t be heard at the AFL national level. In bureaucratic 
fashion, Green deferred much of the decision-making throughout this controversy to Dillon 
despite efforts on both sides with the FLU local to appeal directly to the AFL President. 
Following Bossler’s effort to publicize the local’s controversy in the local Toledo 
newspapers, Dillon, on December 5th, assured Green that, as Taylor reported to him, the 
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decision at the November 23rd meeting to expel Bossler from union membership within the 
local “was handled in a proper manner.”29  Dillon further suggested that neither he nor 
Secretary Morrison should send a reply to any communications sent by Bossler or Ramsey 
until “further advised.”30 Furthermore, according to Dillon, though “the Toledo situation” 
was in a “pretty bad shape,” with the help of Taylor they were “endeavoring to straighten it 
out.”31 Later efforts of Bossler to communicate with Green and Morrison would fall on deaf 
ears. On January 3th, 1935, Bossler sent another urgent telegram to Green’s office “protesting 
[the] election of [the] president” in  the FLU local taking place the next day as “illegal” and 
requested the AFL president to “stop [the] election by telegraph.”32 Green ended up 
forwarding that message to Dillon “for [his] consideration” where it went unheeded. 33  The 
January 4, 1935 election made Ellsworth Kramer, from Bingham Stamping & Tool 
Company, the new president of the union and Fred Schwake of the City Auto Stamping 
Company the new business agent. The latter apparently ran with progressive support though 
he was, at the time, “inexperienced and vacillating” as he came to office “with the promise 
that he would accept the advice of experienced union men like Roland.”34 
The UAW FLU Local #18384 which in its beginnings had made little effort to 
establish regular contact, interaction with and support from the AFL was now actively 
soliciting assistance from the national union leadership. The financial problems and the 
factionalism that developed following the victorious Auto Lite strike, which may have been 
interrelated, saw the FLU local, especially the executive committee, turn to the AFL as both 
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an arbiter and a source of funds. More over, the growing influence of progressive caucus 
most likely played a role in the growing internal divisions as it attempted to gain positions 
within the local. The allegations brought against Ramsey both by the executive committee 
and Floyd Bossler indicated an array of incidents of misconduct as well as alleged subversive 
activities akin to a company union spy. Though the full details surrounding these 
controversies within the FLU local #18384 during this period are not clear, the protracted 
role played by the AFL and its representatives in especially helping to solve these problems 
within the executive committee demonstrated its growing influence over the officers of the 
local. This was in spite of the efforts of progressives to push the local in a direction opposite 
to that of the federation. 
Reinvigorated Toledo organized labor, Workers Party/LCUL and FLU local organizing 
drive 
 While the internal problems of the FLU local progressed following the Auto Lite 
strike, renewed organizing and strike activity marked the rest of organized labor in Toledo. 
The settlement that came out of the Auto Lite Strike, in Roland’s words, “boost[ed] the labor 
movement in Toledo” including both “the new organizations that were coming up” and 
“those that had been in existence for a long time” especially building trades.35 In the twelve 
months between the Auto Lite strike and the Toledo Chevrolet strike, twenty successful or 
partially successful strikes would be waged in the city.36 Since its important role in breaking 
the injunction during the Auto Lite strike, the LCUL had continued its efforts to support the 
activities of Toledo organized labor. Immediately following the Auto Lite strike, the LCUL 
was invited to support the Armour and Swift and Larrowe Milling strikes. Moreover, the 
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LCUL established formal ties with the Toledo Central Labor Union. In an open letter in the 
Toledo CLU’s official newspaper the Toledo Union Leader, Pollock, Preis and Selander 
asked for cooperation from the union locals in recruiting the jobless into the LCUL to gain 
better relief in return for their pledged support and help in boycotts and strikes.  This marked 
the beginning of a partnership between the two organizations.37 Subsequently, Pollock 
became chairman of the Toledo CLU Strike committee and by February 1935 he had formed 
a Joint Action Committee with the entire Building Trades Council and the Workers Alliance. 
This committee ran a general strike among the skilled workers on the Federal Emergency 
Relief projects in Toledo with “mass strike tactics” which had been “completely outside of 
the experience of the skilled craft unions” before then.38 As this strike progressed into March, 
four other strikes occurred, including the general Milk Drivers strike.  This resulted in the 
formation of an unofficial Joint Board of Strategy composed of all the strike leaders 
including Sam Pollock. A joint picket line of all the groups of strikers called the “March of 
Labor” was formed and through “a series of quick concentration on various struck plants and 
projects” closed them all down.39 Thus, following the Auto Lite strike, the Lucas County 
Unemployment League continued to cooperate with and acceptance by organized labor in 
Toledo, especially AFL craft unions notorious for labor conservatism.  This demonstrated 
their continued strength and effectiveness as a community organization to bring the 
unemployed and the employed together in collective struggle.  
In this atmosphere of revitalized union activity, despite its internal problems, FLU 
local #18384 began an organizing drive at the beginning of the production season of 1935 to 
branch out to more auto plant factories in Toledo. According to Preis, the progressives within 
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the local pushed forward this “program of intensive organization.”40 By March 23, 1935, the 
FLU local had three new signed contracts with plants in the area: the Dura Company, the 
Toledo Steel Company and the Myers Regulator Company. The third of these new shops, 
though a small one with only 300 workers had two separate walk outs (January 25-26 and 
February 20- March 4) to earn their union contract.41 With the addition of those shops to the 
union, the local now had contracts with eight different auto part plants in the city. When the 
Auto Labor Board (a federal government body established on March 25th, 1934 to handle 
automobile labor disputes and agents of collective bargaining elections)  unexpectedly 
announced in late March it would be having an election on April 9th in the Toledo Chevrolet 
plant to determine collective bargaining agency, the focus of the FLU’s organizing drive 
turned to this factory. 42 
Up until then, organizing at the Toledo Chevrolet transmissions plant and its 2300 
employees had been difficult even though the shop conditions were quite harsh. The onset of 
the Great Depression saw productions standards raised and wages cut in the factory. The 
former change was the most unbearable part of the working conditions in the plant. With the 
push to increase production by management, as Joseph Ditzel, one of the members of the 
Chevrolet strike committee, describes it “there was no consideration for the individual at all.” 
43  In 1933, sparked by the emergence of NIRA, James Roland formed a shop committee to 
organize the factory. Roland had been a founding member of the FLU local #18384 and an 
elected trustee to the executive committee. But despite the oppressive shop regime within the 
plant, he remained “the only member [of the shop committee] for a while” unable to attract 
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other workers.44  As at Auto Lite, much of this resulted from plant management intimidation 
towards union membership. It was well understood among workers that joining a union in the 
factory would result in termination.45  
Eventually Roland suffered this fate when he was fired for union activity before the 
Auto Lite Strike in March 1934. During this period he joined the Unemployed League and 
“became one of its leading members” as an organizer as well as an experienced striker. 46 In 
the six months between his dismissal and his eventual reinstatement Roland became quite 
involved in the activities of the LCUL. Initially, as a jobless individual receiving relief 
assistance, he had become involved with the organization in its efforts to picket the city’s 
welfare headquarters for improved relief. They wanted cash instead of the inedible groceries 
that the welfare office gave to those unemployed at the time.47Then following his experiences 
in the second Auto Lite strike, Roland became involved in various union and jobless relief 
struggles around Toledo that, in his words, “demanded some leadership” in which he and 
others in the LCUL would “go in and help.”48 By the time he was reinstated at the Chevy 
plant, through his involvement in the LCUL he’d gained “a little bit of information 
[and]…knowledge” about organizing and became a better speaker. These accumulated 
experiences along with his courage made him the “spearhead” of the subsequent organizing 
drive within the Chevrolet plant.49 Moreover, his connections with those in the LCUL and the 
Workers Party, (especially Preis, Pollack and Selander), continued through the organizing 
effort and strike at the Toledo Chevrolet factory. Roland later recalled that he “learned a lot 
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from” Selander and Pollack whom he “owe[d] a lot to them for [his] knowledge as to what is 
right and wrong.”50 Despite the influence those individuals had on him, he never really 
considered himself a left-winger, just a progressive union member. Roland felt that those 
from the LCUL and the Workers Party “were contributing…[,] helpful and…gave a lot of 
good pointers” to push forward the union’s cause.51  
During his period of unemployment, Roland sought a hearing from the Automobile 
Labor Board (ALB) to appeal his dismissal. After he was fired in March, 1934 he had filed a 
grievance with the ALB. After three months of waiting, in June, following the second Auto 
Lite strike, he decided to stage a one man picket in front of the Chevrolet plant demanding a 
hearing before the ALB in Detroit. In terms of the FLU local, it was an “unauthorized” action 
in which the officers on the executive committee did nothing to help because, as Roland 
described it, he was politically “off limits.”52 But the Auto Lite union shop, “still [a] militant 
and progressive group” at the time coming out of their victory, voted at their meeting to 
support his one man picket. This endorsement got into the newspapers during his individual 
strike and, on the heels of the recent working class upheaval, put pressure on the company to 
deal with the situation.53 Subsequently, the Automobile Labor Board (ALB) in Detroit heard 
his case. But when a month passed without notification of the results of his hearing, he told 
the ALB that he would picket again if it did not respond. Roland picketed one more day and 
finally received a notification of reinstatement as an office worker at the Chevy factory. GM 
Vice President Knudsen later told Roland at formal negotiations during the Toledo Chevrolet 
strike that he’d been the one to order him back to work as a way of buying off the 
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organization.54 Considering the great amount of deference and sway the ALB gave to auto 
manufacturers, Knudsen could have easily done this.55 But instead, Roland’s return to the 
plant proved to be the first successful challenge of management’s control over the factory. 
His ability to become re-employed in the plant after being fired for union activity became 
“the spark” and inspiration for others in the plant to get involved in the organization. Among 
those who were the first to sign up were Joseph Ditzel and Bob Travis who became part of 
the organizing drive within the plant and members of the shop committee.56  The fear 
towards unionism among the employees there had diminished.  Roland, in his renewed 
organizing effort, would tell workers in the factory that “you don’t have to be afraid to join 
the union” using his example to tell them that management “aint going to fire no more” for 
organizing.57   
From that time onward, Travis, Roland put into motion an organizing drive in the 
Chevrolet plant. Though the Automobile Labor Board’s initiation of a primary election for 
collective bargaining representation within the Chevy factory was important in bringing the 
workers into the union, the struggle that took place on the shop floor at that time was just as 
significant. During the organizational campaign, Bob Travis confronted his supervisors on 
the shop floor over the limited number of bullard gear operators that they hired which 
overburdened those who worked the machine. His supervisors tried to intimidate Travis into 
going back to work through the threat of termination. In an act of defiance, he and the other 8 
operators came together and he said to the supervisors “if you fire us you fire everybody else 
in this place.” Through an informal action on the shop floor, he and the other operators 
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forced management to hire more operators.  Such an action “just by talking up to the 
superintendent” and getting results “was like a spark in a forest of trees” for the organizing 
drive bringing in over a thousand workers into the union by the April 9th election. 58 Leading 
up to that election were two “jammed and enthusiastic” mass meeting where over 900 
workers attended.59 Art Preis, remarked that such rapid organizing in this factory as “one of 
the most successful attempts…to unionize a plant of the giant General Motors Corp.”60   
Despite the AFL’s advice to the Federal Labor Unions to boycott elections under the 
auspice of the Automobile Labor Board, FLU local #18384 and the Chevy plant shop 
committee both ignored the federation’s recommendation. They felt that the elections would 
be useful for furthering the union cause within the factory.61 As a result, the FLU local’s new 
business agent, Fred Schwake was placed on the ballot as its candidate and he received 62 
percent of the 2140 employees that voted. 62  
With this initial victory in hand, the Chevy shop committee didn’t wait for the final 
ALB runoff election scheduled for April 24th.  Part of their strategy was “to [always] keep 
one step ahead of the company.” They promptly established a contract committee of about 40 
workers representing every section of the factory. From this came an agreement proposal, 
modeled on the ones the FLU local had already signed with the other auto plant parts in 
Toledo, with five major demands: a signed contract, full seniority, a 10 percent wage 
increase, 70 cent minimum, and the thirty-six- hour week which was sent to the plant 
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management on April 16.63 The shop committee then met with management on April 18th to 
discuss the agreement but this proved unsuccessful and on April 20th, at a union meeting, it 
was given the power to call a strike by the members. With this delegated capability, the shop 
committee made plans for a strike set for April 22nd at 7 am. By that time, fundamental 
disagreements had arisen between labor and management during the negotiations.  In 
addition, Chevrolet’s efforts to seemingly thwart the union by delaying the final ALB 
elections, holding small conferences with employees about the ALB elections and appearing 
to prepare for a “showdown strike” by hiring extra guards and installing wire netting on the 
windows of the Chevy plant had pushed the shop committee to the point of declaring a strike. 
The company most likely learned about this decision from the GM-hired Pinkerton Agent on 
the shop committee, Ben Bonner, because on April 22 they resumed negotiations with a 
twelve hour long session in which management gave their counteroffer. GM’s proposal 
disregarded all the union’s key demands and refused to give it exclusive collective 
bargaining rights and a signed contract. Despite this apparent effort to delay the walkout, the 
shop committee put their plan into action the next day.64 The next day, in response to the 
walkout they most likely knew was coming, management at the Chevy plant distributed their 
counterproposal to incoming workers. This “created a lot of confusion” among the workers 
as they stood around reading the counterproposal and made it initially more difficult to get 
the workers out of the factory.65 Despite such efforts, the shop committee, with each member 
(except Roland who was in charge of establishing the picket line) assigned to an area or 
department of the plant, eventually brought out much of the workers with little additional 
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trouble. 66 A majority of the workers of that shift left voluntarily and management sent the 
rest home while the second shift of 1200 workers didn’t even report for work. 67 
 
Toledo Chevrolet Strike of 1935: Internal Divisions 
The Toledo Chevrolet transmission plant was owned by the Chevrolet Motor Ohio 
Company a division of the General Motors Corporation (GMC). GMC, at the time, was the 
“Leviathan of the auto industry” with the most extensive array of domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries, divisions and affiliates which, in 1934, accounted for 43.5 percent of all cars 
sold.68 Taking on such a mammoth corporation in Toledo was new terrain for the FLU which 
up until then had organized local, independent automobile parts and manufacturing plants. As 
a result, a strike against GMC required a different approach to force important concessions 
from it, including a signed union contract especially in face of its virulently anti-union 
policy. The Toledo Chevrolet transmission plant was a crucial part of the GMC national 
production chain because it was the only one then making Chevrolet and Pontiac 
transmissions.  Thus, any shutdown of that factory, as Historian Sidney Fine notes, “was 
bound to have repercussions for G.M. as a whole”69 Even so, as later events would show 
during and after the strike, the extensive resources of the national GMC gave it the ability to 
shift production in face of localized labor troubles. Thus the strike had national implications 
for both G.M. as well as a potential “genuine show-down on the issue of unionism in the 
automobile industry.”70  
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The Chevy shop committee which became the strike committee once the walk out 
began had nine members on it but its leadership stemmed from three individuals: James 
Roland (chairman), Joseph Ditzel and Bob Travis. Roland, only 23 years old at the time, had 
by far the most experience with unionism among them and because of his courageous act of 
defiance through his successful one man picket “people [in the plant] just rallied around 
him.”71 He was also the most radical, militant and influential member of the strike 
committee. Travis later recalled that Roland was “the guy who started [him] in left wing 
politics.”72 But, in terms of political ideology, besides Roland and Ditzel, a “Norman Thomas 
socialist,” the rest of the committee “represented just the ordinary American with the 
ordinary [political] outlook.”73  Members of the strike committee were all, in Ditzel’s words, 
“strong believers in getting…the contract that [they] felt would really do something for the 
people in the plant.”74 In order to achieve this, the strike committee along with other union 
progressives within the FLU local sought to expand the strike effort to other GMC plants. 
Furthermore they wanted to maintain the strike “on a militant, mass action basis” with the 
leadership and decision making in the hands of the strike committee.75 
With the walkout initiated on April 23, the strike committee moved to implement 
their plan. That day, Roland, John Paterwich (another member of the strike committee) and 
Schwake quickly formed a strong mass picket line at the entrances of the factory with the 
help of progressives from other plants within the FLU local. Among those progressives was 
Bill Prior, a member at the Bingham plant shop committee, a veteran of the Auto Lite strikes 
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and a Workers Party member who became a picket captain.76 Prior “came in handy to the 
strike committee” on the first day’s picketing when “in only a short time” mobilized the 
picket line in front of the employees entrance.77 There were other progressives whom Roland 
trusted and “volunteered to help on [their] picket line.”78 Later into the strike, FLU local 
members from the Auto Lite and Bingham plants made a “guest performance” when Chevy 
picketers took a break for a membership meeting. These “old veterans” whose “great fighting 
in the past has won a string of union contracts” wanted “to show [the striking Chevy] union 
youngsters how it was done.”79 Thus from the first day onward the Chevy strike committee 
established a discipline picket based on universal participation where each striker registered 
for six hour shifts. The pickets were organized in “semi-military style” divided into four six-
hour shifts with designated “captains” who wore white armbands in charge of each of these 
groups. Both I.A.M (International Association of Machinists) and MESA (Mechanics 
Education Society of America) members within the factory also came out in a sympathy 
strike and refused to return until the matter was settled. 80 In sharp contrast to the Auto Lite 
strike a year ago, the Chevrolet Company made little attempt to break the picket line.  
Combined with its discipline and strength, the strikers had a great deal of control over who 
could enter and exit the plant. That control was initially put on display on the first day when 
the picket halted a railroad shipment of completed transmissions as well as the removal of 31 
cars of raw material from the Chevrolet plant.81 Subsequent Chevrolet officials and clerical 
staff would have to ask permission from the strike committee to enter the plant during the 
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strike. Their control over this key plant throughout the entire strike made 32,000 workers idle 
in other GM plants across the country.82 
As the picket line became established, the strike committee began expanding the 
strike initiative to other GMC plants. They initially sent out telegrams on the first day of the 
strike to Francis Dillon (who they didn’t inform of the walk out decision beforehand) as well 
as all the other union locals in General Motors informing them about the strike and calling on 
them to take similar action.83 The strike committee also established committees to visit other 
General Motors plants in Cleveland, Flint, Detroit, Bay City, Saginaw, and Norwood to get 
the union locals there to vote on a walkout and get a national agreement with GMC.84 The 
first visit was to Detroit on April 26th where the General Motors Building as well as the big 
Chevrolet plant was picketed with banners and copies of “Strike Truth” bulletin circulars 
were distributed.  However, the picketers were subsequently escorted out of the city by the 
Detroit police and their material was confiscated.85 Through distribution of the bulletin to 
other GM union locals as well as Toledo striker emissaries, the strike committee sought to 
nationalize strike sentiment. On April 29th, a resolution was passed by the Toledo strikers at a 
meeting to further institutionalize the movement towards a national walkout. The resolution 
encouraged all 23 GM union locals to go on strike and to set up a national joint-action 
committee composed of representatives from each local as a means of negotiating with GM 
for a shared settlement. This meant to facilitate an agreement with GMC on a national basis 
in which “no local to return to work until every local agrees to return.”86 By April 30th, the 
efforts of the delegations to various GM locals seemed to be paying off as Thomas Williams, 
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a federal conciliator sent to mediate the strike in Toledo, remarked that the situation had “all 
the appearance of developing into a general strike.”87 At that time, the Norwood Chevrolet 
and Fisher Body with its 1700 employees joined in a sympathy strike with similar written 
demands to that of the Toledo Chevrolet workers and both Cleveland and Atlanta GMC 
plants were closed before strike action could be taken by the union local there. Moreover, 
MESA voted to refuse to handle material from Toledo until their strike was settled.88 These 
efforts by the Chevrolet strike committee and the rank and file strikers to nationalize the walk 
out attempted to create a sense of unity and solidarity between GMC union locals which by 
their structure as separate AFL federal labor unions lacked the ability to formulate collective 
action and bargaining power. 
As the Chevrolet strike committee handled the direction and formation of the walkout 
both on a national and local basis, it also combated General Motor’s propaganda in the local 
newspapers. On the first day of the strike, April 23rd, GM already had placed a full page ad in 
the Toledo News Bee as well as other Toledo newspapers that explained its position and the 
“outstanding gains” that it had offered the union before the walk out emerged while trying to 
demonize the strikers for their actions claiming it to be “unwarranted” and as “not 
contributing to [national] recovery.”89 GM demanded that its proposal be immediately 
submitted to the Chevrolet workers to be voted on. On the day afterwards, the strike 
committee issued its own statement that addressed each point that GM made in its ad. 
Specifically the strike committee analyzed and rebutted each of the various parts of the 
company’s proposal.90  
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On the same day, April 24th, the Chevrolet strikers voted to establish a strike bulletin 
called “Strike Truth”; the first edition was published two days later. Joseph Ditzel and Bob 
Travis were co-editors-in-chief of the first “Strike Truth” and Art Preis, secretary of Toledo 
branch of the Workers Party, was the associate editor.91 The publication was initially 
intended to be a daily medium for the strike committee “to blast the lies” of GM as well as a 
“mighty weapon to expose and explain the many bewildering insidious and treacherous 
attempts of the bosses to [regularly] exploit the workers.”92 It marked “a forward step for the 
entire labor movement in Toledo” as such an initiative had never before been attempted in 
that city, thus ending “the old game of demoralizing a strike by propaganda of a kept 
press.”93 On April 26th, publication of the next Strike Truth was halted because of complaints 
on the strike committee that it was too “communistic” with a motion put forth by Ben 
Bonner.94 But it was re-started on April 30th by vote of Toledo Chevy strikers during a 
membership meeting.     
Despite the progress made by the Chevrolet strike committee in conducting the walk 
out, both the national AFL, through its representative, Francis Dillon, as well as individuals 
within the FLU local executive committee became road blocks in its efforts. Initially, a day 
after the beginning of the strike, both Green and Dillon gave the AFL’s official support of the 
actions of the Toledo Chevrolet workers, even though the FLU local didn’t get their approval 
beforehand.95 Both of them, at that time, announced that they expected that such sentiments 
would spread to other GM plants though didn’t actually encourage those FLU locals to take 
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such actions.96  On that same day, Dillon began his efforts to gain control and influence over 
the Toledo Chevrolet strike. As Dillon later described it he “went into the City of Toledo and 
with the assistance and cooperation of the Local Executive Board assumed charge of the 
situation and directed the officers and members of the Union as to the proper procedure in the 
handling of the strike in conformity with the policies of the American Federation of Labor.”97  
On April 24th, he announced that the Chevrolet strikers would vote on the company’s 
proposal as the strike committee had mistakenly refused to do earlier at the mass meeting on 
April 26th as GM had demanded.98At that meeting, on the invitation of Fred Schwake, Dillon 
gave a speech to over 1600 Chevrolet strikers in attendance. His speech expressed his 
paternalist attitude towards the Toledo strikers proclaiming he was speaking to them “not for 
the purpose of gaining [their] applause nor of gaining any favor” but to “say only those 
things which will solidify [them] and contribute to the success of [their] endeavors.” He 
seemingly tried to the toe the line as a neutral party in the matter of the walkout, as a force of 
reconciliation between the Toledo strikers and the GM management. Though he denounced 
GM as “the most power, the most unscrupulous, the most relentless corporation in America” 
he also complimented the Vice President of GM, W.S. Knudsen, as “one of the most capable 
and honorable men in industry today.” Dillon also announced that T.N. Taylor would be 
staying in Toledo for the remainder of the strike and he asked the strikers to “be governed by 
him” and to “heed well his words of advice” for which, based on his “many years of 
experience” would come “improved conditions” as well as a new relationship between 
worker and management in the auto industry transforming “the autocratic and impractical 
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and irresponsible” one that currently existed. Through Taylor, Dillon wanted to assert his 
own influence on the strike situation in Toledo. Out of that meeting came a resolution Dillon 
put through and unanimously adopted to formally rejecting the company’s proposal as well 
as demanding that GM resume direct negotiations with the strike.99 From then onward, 
Dillon sought to position himself during the walkout as the “responsible labor leader” both in 
the press as well as in relation to GM, in contrast to the “irresponsible local boys” on the 
strike committee.100  
Furthermore, Dillon managed to use his position as AFL national representative to 
prevent efforts to spread and coordinate the walk out on a national basis among the GM FLU 
locals. Cautious and conservative in nature, Dillon believed that the GM locals weren’t 
strong enough to challenge the company.101 Dillon also held back several other GM locals 
from going on strike, for they waited on his approval. On April 30th, Roland criticized the 
national AFL for such a policy and urged other GM locals to walkout since they wouldn’t be 
granted permission otherwise.102 One of the crucial GM union locals needed for involvement 
in the strike to force GM to make important concessions was the Buick plant in Flint and its 
9000 employees. GM’s efforts to shift production formerly done at the Toledo plant to the 
Flint location created anger among Buick workers. On April 28th the executive board of the 
AFL FLU local #18512 in the Buick factory, in a letter to GMC management, wrote that the 
increase in the workload within this factory was “creating among the employees of the Buick 
plant a deep-seated feeling of resentment and hatred” and it wanted a conference 
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(subsequently granted) to discuss this issue on April 30th.103 Out of this conference between 
the Buick president and the FLU local #18512 executive board came an agreement that there 
should be no work on any transmissions after Friday, May 3, no substantial increase in 
Pontiac transmissions for the remainder of the week and no work at all on Chevrolet 
transmissions while the union agreed that there would be no strike until May 6th which the 
company management implied that would be the date that the Toledo strike would be 
settled.104 On the night of April 30th, a large delegation of Toledo strikers, including James 
Roland, went to Flint to visit the 300 members of the Buick local who were meeting to vote 
on this agreement. The Buick local membership voted in favor of the agreement which had 
given the executive board discretion to defer the strike “if it seemed advisable.”105 On May 
5th, the night before the strike, Dillon went and spoke at the Buick union local meeting and 
appealed to the executive board to delay the strike action pending the outcome of the 
Department of Labor poll of the Toledo Chevrolet workers over the company’s original 
counter-proposal. 106 On May 11th, however, the Buick local executive board voted to strike 
on May 14th regardless of the developments in Toledo because, in the words of their union 
president, “it [was] a question of survival of the union” in the plant. Despite that supposed 
urgency, again the Buick FLU executive board bowed to Dillon’s wishes and deferred a 
strike on May 13th even with the presence of Toledo strikers at that meeting.107  
Within the union, divisions over the handling of the strike emerged among 
individuals on the executive board that were exacerbated by the presence and oversight of 
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Dillon. Individuals on the executive committee such as the President Ellsworth Kramer, 
George Addes and Fred Schwake expressed continual distrust of the strike committee and its 
left wing allies during the strike.  Early in the formation of the picket line, Fred Schwake, in 
his officially proscribed position of overseeing the strike, excluded left-wing groups 
including the Communist Party, the Workers Party and the Unemployed League announcing 
that “this strike is our own affair and we’ll keep it clean or know the reason why.”108 
Schwake’s desire to keep the strike “clean” may have been a result of his own bias against 
the influence of left wing forces within the local, especially the Workers Party and 
Unemployed League that could undermine his authority as it did with Ramsey during the 
Auto Lite strikes.  
In terms of spreading the walkout, at first the union executive committee was just as 
anxious as the Toledo Chevrolet strikers to get other GM locals involved. Both Fred 
Schwake and George Addes traveled to and spoke along side the Chevrolet strikers at the 
meeting with the Norwood GM locals encouraging them to join the walk out.109 But as the 
walk out progressed and the strike committee sought to formalize a common strike policy 
among all the GM locals, the executive board attempted to curtail their power. Much of this 
was in step with the desires of Dillon who sought to localize the Toledo Chevrolet strike as 
well. When the Chevrolet strike committee, on May 10th, called for a May 12th conference of 
GM locals to discuss the creation of a joint strike committee, under the influence of Dillon, 
the executive board repudiated the invitation with follow-up wires to the GM locals that 
canceled the meeting and stated that Roland had sent the invitations “without 
                                                 
108 The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle, p. 390. 
109 Birth of a Union Local: The History of UAW Local 674, Norwood, Ohio, 1933 to 1940, John Kruchko 
72  
authorization.”110 It also withheld funds from the strike and tried to prevent the publishing of 
a second “Strike Truth” publication. At a meeting of 150 strike leaders and picket captains 
with George Addes, financial secretary of FLU local , when one of them asked about the 
publication of the next issue of Strike Truth, Addes, in paternalist fashion, responded “you’ve 
got to trust your local executive committee fellows, you gave us the power to put it out at our 
discretion” causing a round of boos from the audience.111 Individuals on the executive 
committee may have not liked the first edition of the Strike Truth because of its obvious left 
wing presence with Art Preis listed as associate editor. The second edition would replace 
Preis with Walter Gunthrup, editor of the Toledo Union Leader, as associate editor.     
As Dillon increased his control over the Toledo strike, GM maintained an obstinate 
stance, but this may have been a stalling tactic while the company initiated efforts to 
undermine the strike. On April 27th, GM responded to the FLU local’s resolution for 
resuming negotiations, passed the night before, with a refusal to do so formally with the 
union while they remained on strike.112 By May 4th, during informal negotiations between 
the company and the AFL officials, GM and its Vice President Knudsen remained 
“absolutely unyielding” in their position towards the FLU local. In that time, as the Toledo 
Chevy strikers maintained full control of the picket line in front of the transmission plant, 
GMC began to shift production of transmissions to other plants. The company started 
transferring production of Pontiac transmissions to the Buick plant in Flint, Michigan as well 
as refurbishing an abandoned factory in Muncie, Indiana at the cost of $800,000 for 
additional manufacturing of Chevrolet transmission. On May 7th, the latter plant was put into 
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production with 400 workers and by May 12th, had allowed the reopening of the St. Louis 
assembly.113 Moreover, a back-to-work movement began on April 29th “started by 
supervision” from the Chevrolet plant to contest the Chevy strikers’ claim that they spoke for 
the majority of the workers by circulating a petition for either returning to work on the basis 
of GM’s proposal or, if that failed, for a vote of employees through secret ballot on the 
company’s terms. On May 4th this group, now called the Independent Workers Association, 
had a mass meeting at the Toledo Chamber of Commerce auditorium (home to a business 
organization who’d already had put out an ad in the Toledo News-Bee against the Chevy 
strike with the title “No one ever won a strike”) which was addressed by the Toledo 
Chevrolet plant’s former general manager. With 1600 people, all allegedly Chevrolet 
employees, in attendance the IWA claimed to have gotten 1400 signatures. 114 Though, 
according to the strike committee, no FLU local officers or members of the strike committee 
were allowed into the event and signing the petition was required for admission. Moreover, 
much of those that did attend were workers that had previously been employed at the 
Chevrolet plant.115  
Fearing the impact that the IWA would have on the public opinion, Dillon took 
further control of the direction of the strike when he sought to affirm the Toledo strikers’ 
position. He proposed and secured a Dept. of Labor conducted poll of the Chevrolet 
employees over whether or not they supported GM’s proposal. After getting the strike 
committee’s reluctant consent on May 5th, Dillon’s proposal was put into motion on May 8th 
when the Chevy workers voted on the ballot. The outcome overwhelming favored the union 
as 1251-605 in rejection of the company’s offer. The results had vindicated Dillon’s position 
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when GM, in face of this telling vote, reversed its position and scheduled a conference for 
formal negotiations with the Chevy strike committee, on May 11th.116 During this 18 hour 
marathon session Dillon appeared all too eager to get a settlement regardless of the strike 
committee’s position and “surrender demands that the committee considered 
fundamental.”117 But in a negotiation recess Roland convinced Dillon to allow the rank and 
file of the Toledo Chevy union to have the final decision on any agreement that would be 
reached. The proposed agreement that came out of this conference met few of the Chevy 
strikers demands including a signed contract. But Dillon now seemed determined to get the 
union to accept this GM offer after the V.P. William Knudsen told him it would be the 
company’s final offer and threatened to dismantle the Toledo plant if it was rejected. 118 On 
May 12th, not only did Dillon publicly endorse the potential agreement but he attacked the 
leaders of the strike who “speak in the interest of workers the language of Soviet 
dictatorship.”119 Such actions had angered the strike committee and spread the word to vote 
down the agreement. On May 13th during the mass meeting for voting on GM’s proposal a 
resolution was passed, contrary to AFL regulations, that only members of the strike 
committee could address the crowd which excluded Dillon. Dillon stormed out of the 
meeting and declared that the FLU local was no long a part of the AFL. Though the strike 
committee wasn’t concerned by this, the executive committee scrambled to bring Dillon back 
into the meeting. George Addes left the meeting to retrieve Dillon from his hotel room.120 
Upon his return, greeted by boos, Dillon gave a 30 minute speech and near its end he gave a 
                                                 
116 The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle, p. 397 
117 Heroes of Unwritten Story, Henry Kraus, p. 103 
118 The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle, p. 398 
119 Dillon’s report of Chevrolet strike to UAW FLU locals, May 17, 1935 Henry Kraus Collection, box 3 
120 The Automobile Under the Blue Eagle, p. 399 
 
75  
thinly veiled threat to the crowd: “if you refuse to accept this offer with in forty-eight hours 
you will regret it and I am prepared to prove it.”121 But more importantly, when the ballots 
were distributed, Fred Schwake read the agreement and pointed out the gains made under it 
which, considering the support he had among the rank and file as their elected business 
agent, may have turned the tide towards voting for its acceptance. The outcome of the ballot 
favored accepting the GM’s proposal by overwhelming numbers which ended the strike. But 
this voting result also seemed, in part, to be achieved through elements of coercion that 
Dillon exerted over the meeting. Yet this agreement signified a partial victory for the Toledo 
Chevy union for it had successfully conducted a strike against GM and revealed a chink in 
the auto giant’s armor. Later, a resolution was passed in the FLU local petitioning AFL 
President William Green to “deprive Francis J. Dillon of his credentials as an AFL 
organizer” and condemned the conduct of Dillon during the strike as “in violation of 
democratic procedure.”122 But Addes later assured Dillon that there were no more than 60 
people were present at the meeting in which this resolution was adopted.123 
Conclusion 
 Activity among the progressives within the FLU local animated the period leading up 
to the Toledo Chevrolet strike. Indicative of this was their efforts to organize more plants and 
attain positions within the local. But more importantly, this progressive element of the rank 
and file seemed to be a network of trust and mutual support born out of their shared struggle 
during the second Auto Lite strike. Though the officers of the FLU local didn’t recognize 
Roland’s one-man picket, the Auto Lite shop committee came out in support which, in part, 
helped him get reinstated. Moreover, once the Toledo Chevrolet got started, the support of 
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progressives from other plants including Bingham and Auto Lite helped to immediately 
establish a strong picket line.  
 But the clashes that emerged between the Toledo Chevy strike committee, Dillon as 
well as the FLU local executive committee, demonstrated the limitations of a local struggle 
against a national corporation without institutional support. GM’s refusal to negotiate with 
the Toledo strikers while it took action to undermine the union’s position illustrated the need 
to spread the walk out in order to further cripple the company’s production. But the strike 
committee’s effort to spread its walk out nationally and formally establish a strike policy 
with other GM FLU locals on that basis didn’t have much of a chance without the support of 
Dillon. The national AFL leadership’s control over the FLU locals gave Dillon’s 
conservative position the upper hand over that of the Toledo strikers. That same control 
probably influenced local #18384’s executive committee to help localize the Chevy walk out. 
The desire for rank and file control over this issue of nationalizing the walk out which 
emanated from the Chevy strike committee and subsequently thwarted by Dillon along side 
their executive committee became the impetus for building a union of all auto workers. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  






 The outcome of the Toledo Chevrolet strike demonstrated to the leadership both at 
the top ranks of the AFL as well as at the grassroots, rank and file level that there was a need 
for an organization of all the UAW unions. Both Dillon and Green, on June 17th, 1935 
realized that the time was right to launch an International and began the process towards that 
goal by surveying the sentiments of the UAW FLUs on the issue. With an overwhelmingly 
favorable response, Dillon set a date for August 26, 1935 for a convention in Detroit to 
establish an International union. On the grassroots level, a progressive movement towards the 
same goal had been fomenting since June, 1934 under the leadership of Wyndham Mortimer, 
a member of the Communist Party, and the Cleveland District Auto Council (CDAC), 
composed of the various auto locals in the city. However, their program for an International 
union stood in opposition to the cautious policies of the AFL and its leadership. The CDAC 
held four rank and file conferences in various locations, the last of which was in Toledo 
(right before the Detroit convention) with representatives from an array of UAW FLUs.  
Within FLU local #18384, interest in an International union had grown since the 
Toledo Chevrolet strike. The local had even sent an open letter to other FLUs to gage their 
opinion on this issue before Dillon and Green did so through their surveys. By July, 1935 the 
FLU local had voted in favor of the measure at a membership meeting. The union leadership 
in the Toledo Chevrolet plant, who had been so adamant in promoting unity among the GM 
locals during the 1935 walk-out, became involved in the progressive rank and file movement 
when it hosted the final CDAC conference before the Detroit convention. But the FLU local 
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executive board controlled the selection of delegates to the Detroit convention via an 
appointment process instead of through membership election as the convention call had 
stipulated. As a result, only Travis and Bonner, the latter a conservative member of the shop 
committee, were selected to go from the Toledo Chevrolet unit.  
During the Detroit convention, the FLU local #18384 delegation publicly expressed 
anti-Dillon and anti-AFL sentiments while utilizing the clout of its large delegation size 
behind the scenes to gain influence within the nascent International union. Although the 
officers of the International union were eventually appointed by Green near the end of the 
convention, members of the Toledo delegation were constantly politicking with other 
delegations to formulate a voting bloc that included George Addes for International secretary 
treasurer. Publicly, at moments during the Detroit convention, individual Toledo delegates 
expressed their resentment towards AFL leadership, especially after Green appointed Dillon 
as president and the International executive council. 
In the aftermath of the Detroit convention of 1935, a controversy emerged between 
the Dillon and the Toledo Chevrolet local over the issuance over a new UAW International 
charter. This drawn out episode between the Toledo local and Dillon was driven by the 
latter’s personal vendetta against the former as he over-stepped his own constitutional powers 
as president in attempting to split the amalgamated local into separate ones. During that time, 
the Toledo Chevrolet unit requested a separate charter from Dillon and became Local 14. The 
Toledo Chevrolet shop was undergoing internal issues caused by the decision of General 
Motors management to relocate several pieces of machinery and equipment from the Toledo 
plant to non-union factories in Muncie, Indiana and Saginaw, Michigan. This act reduced 
employment within the Toledo factory by 66 percent and revealed the true shortcoming of 
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the agreement that had settled the Toledo Chevrolet strike. At the same time, the Chevrolet 
shop leadership was still having problems with the FLU local executive board over issues of 
money and other matters of “union politics”. Those experiences had made both the Toledo 
Chevrolet union workers and its leadership even more anxious to work more closely with 
other GM locals and to organize the rest of the auto giant as Local 14. The Local 14 election 
brought forth much of the aggressive leadership that had headed the shop and strike 
committee under the FLU local.  
The divisions that emerged between the Toledo Chevrolet unit and the FLU local 
#18384 executive board during the Chevy strike became exacerbated during the first months 
of the newly launched UAW International.  Between the Detroit convention in 1935 and the 
South Bend Convention April, 1936 opinions diverged and tensions rose over financial, 
strategic, and ideological issues. The outcome was the establishment of Local 12 (much of 
what was FLU local #18384) and Local 14 (the Toledo Chevrolet plant). The latter would 
play an important support role in the months leading up to and during the G.M. sit-down 
strikes of 1936-1937 that would ultimately produce a national agreement with the UAW. 
Underlying all this was the progressive rank and file activity and militancy in the FLU local, 
in the aftermath of the Chevrolet strike, which took on a national dimension. This became 
especially true with the efforts of the Chevrolet to create a democratic, membership 
controlled, militant UAW International focused on a national coordination and organizing 
plan among GM locals. The GM sit-down strikes in Flint, Michigan would be the climax of 
this rank and file effort. 
Formation of the International UAW 
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In the months following the partial union victory resulting from the Toledo Chevrolet 
strike, a movement to create a separate International union of all the UAW FLUs in the AFL 
gained momentum. Earlier, in February 12, 1935 the AFL Executive Council passed a 
resolution (put forth by John L. Lewis) to charter the creation of an international union for 
the UAW. The nature of this union was restricted to a semi-industrial character which, 
because of the influence of the craft unionists on the Executive Council, limited its 
jurisdiction to mainly production workers. The resolution recommended that the Federation 
officers form the union when in their judgment it was “appropriate and convenient” to do so. 
By June 17th, the outcome of the Toledo Chevrolet strike as well as the subsequent 
conferences between GM and the UAW FLUs from the various GM plants had persuaded 
Green and Dillon that the time was right to create an international. They distributed a survey 
to all the UAW FLUs to get their opinion on this issue and the response was overwhelmingly 
in favor.1  Accordingly, Dillon announced that a convention to form an International union 
would be held in Detroit on August 26th. 
Though Green and Dillon were just realizing the importance of an international union 
for the UAW, a movement for such an organization had been developing on a grassroots 
level in Cleveland since the summer of 1934. After attending the June 1934 AFL national 
conference of UAW FLUs, the White Motor FLU local of Cleveland, dissatisfied with the 
fact that the conference had created an advisory National Council instead of an international 
auto worker union, initiated a grassroots movement for such an organization. Wyndham 
Mortimer, a member of the Communist Party, led the White Motor FLU and was one of the 
driving forces for such a union of all auto locals. Mortimer felt strongly that an international 
union of all auto workers should be rooted in rank and file control. This idea meant that “the 
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membership [is] in control of their own union” to decide their policy towards employers 
especially over that of strikes as well as internal union issues such as dues and officer 
salaries. Strike policy could only be decided by the membership because only “they know the 
conditions under which [they] work,” thus such decisions must be rooted in that collective 
voice.2 His vision for an International was a bottom up model which would be shaped by the 
ideas, initiatives and experiences of the auto workers rather than the top down command and 
control structure that was then so prevalent among trade unions in the AFL. 
With that in mind, in the summer of 1934 he jumpstarted the rank and file movement 
towards an international auto work union with the formation of the Cleveland District Auto 
Council (CDAC) representing all the nine auto locals in the area.  In August 1934, the CDAC 
held a conference and issued a manifesto calling for “the adoption of a policy of aggressive 
struggle against the employers, the establishment of militant leadership in the unions and the 
unification of the federal local[s] into an International Union within the A.F. of L. based on 
the principle of industrial unionism and rank and file control.”3 A month later, on September 
16, 1934, despite hostility from national AFL officials, the CDAC hosted a Conference for an 
International Union of All Automobile and Auto Parts Workers in the AFL which was 
attended by fifty delegates from 36 other FLU locals. Before the August 1935 Detroit 
convention, there were three more of these rank and file conferences, each with the purpose 
of promoting the international union as well as the CDAC program for confronting and 
organizing the auto industry. Important as well in this effort was the CDAC’s publication of 
the United Auto Worker newspaper, edited by Henry Kraus, to popularize the movement. 
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Mortimer initially only sent copies of the paper to auto unionists whom he had met at the 
AFL national conference but its circulation soon grew to 65,000. 4 
Coming out of the partial success of the Toledo Chevrolet strike, FLU local #18384 
had also grown interested in an international auto union. Despite the tension that had 
emerged between the Chevrolet strike committee and the executive board over handling the 
walk out, there was still strong sentiment within the local for formal cooperation between 
UAW FLUs as a result of that experience. On June 3rd, Siefke wrote an open letter to other 
locals stating that the recent Toledo Chevrolet strike “has proved again” that they all “must 
bind themselves together to secure the goals they are seeking.” He sought their opinion on 
this issue of whether “the best results” could be obtained by “remaining directly affiliated 
with the A.F. of L” as federal labor unions or “through an international [union]” as the 
Toledo local had been considering the latter. Those within the Toledo local felt that a 
conference of all the UAW FLUs should be called “in the near future” to discuss the matter 
and “lay the foundation for an international” if approved by the majority of locals.5  
Despite shared sentiments FLU local’s for an International UAW, progressives in the 
Toledo union took the initiative to shape its program and structure. During the Toledo 
Chevrolet strike, the leaders, James Roland, Joe Ditzel, Bob Travis and Kenny Cole, became 
acquainted with the CDAC movement through Henry Kraus. The commitment of the Toledo 
Chevrolet shop committee to rank and file control over their strike, and its implementation of 
aggressive tactics to establish the walk out on a national level among GM locals, fit quite 
well into the overall mission and manifesto that CDAC had espoused since August of 1934.  
Thus, a little less than a month after the strike ended the Toledo Chevy leadership along side 
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other progressives within FLU local #18384 met on June 8th& 9th , before the announcement 
of the Detroit convention,in Toledo with others from this rank and file movement. The 
Toledo delegation (26 total), especially the Chevrolet union leadership, was well received as 
the “stars of the show” in light of their accomplishments during the recent strike. The 
delegates at the conference expressed their respect for the Toledo Chevrolet union leadership 
by unanimously choosing Roland to chair the gathering as “homage” to their achievement.6 
At that meeting, the rank and file caucus finalized their platform for an International UAW 
on the basis of several principles: an industrial union with full jurisdiction over all auto 
workers in the industry, a democratic union controlled by the membership over its leadership, 
no discrimination based on color, nationality, or religious/ political beliefs, and a program for 
“militant struggle” against employers in pursuit of auto worker demands. Moreover, the 
Toledo delegation, most likely based on their experiences with the Lucas County 
Unemployed League, put forth a resolution for the progressive caucus to “go on record as 
actively aiding in the organization of genuine working class organization of the unemployed” 
which was subsequently adopted. In particular they urged the FLUs to “cooperate actively” 
with the unemployed and their organization to win union rates of wages and in establishing 
union conditions on federal relief projects.7 Near the end of the meeting, preparations were 
made for the potential convention for establishing an International union. Among the most 
“immediate tasks” was to present and discuss the proposal for an International UAW within 
all groups in the locals.8 Roland later wrote that if such an International had existed at the 
time of the Toledo Chevrolet strike they “could have secured a signed agreement covering all 
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the General Motors plants that is of course if we had democracy in our International.”9 Thus 
for progressives within the Toledo union, especially within the Chevrolet unit, the next 
logical step in the aftermath of their squelched rank and file initiative to nationalize the 
recent walkout was to work for a militant International UAW controlled by membership.  
Following the announcement of the Detroit convention, favorable sentiment from 
both from the executive committee and from progressives actively promoting an 
International UAW, assured an endorsement for the organization from the Toledo local. 
However, on July 1st Tom Ramsey, still a member of the National Council and a Dillon 
loyalist, tried to claim otherwise. In an open letter to the FLU UAWs he announced that the 
Toledo union had gone “on record as opposing an International” in a recent union meeting 
because the auto industry was “not yet organized to the extent that [they] could support” such 
an organization. But that announcement was quickly rescinded as Henry Kraus published in 
the July issue of the United Auto Worker, that “by an overwhelming vote” the Toledo local 
and its 12,000 members were in favor of creating an International auto union.10  
Despite widespread support for the International UAW within the Toledo union, the 
means by which convention delegates were selected demonstrated a divisio between some 
members of the executive board and the progressive elements in the local, especially that of 
the Chevrolet unit. Although the August 1 convention call notice from Dillon had stipulated 
that delegates were to be elected by membership, the FLU local #18384’s executive 
committee decided instead to appoint delegates for the Detroit convention.11 According to 
Burke Cochran, vice president of the MESA local in Toledo, at the membership meeting in 
which this occurred, Tom Ramsey put through the motion and the president refused to 
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entertain any further discussion or motions on the issue. Moreover, there were apparently 
twenty policemen stationed at the entrance of the union hall to “terrorize the membership and 
to prevent any distribution of the progressive program.”12 This may have been a work of 
collusion between AFL officials, namely Tom Ramsey, the AFL national office and the 
executive board to exclude “nominees sponsored by the Communist Party” from becoming 
delegates to the auto worker convention as had happened in other FLU locals.13 Much of this 
was targeted at Roland who had been a leading opposition voice among the progressives 
within the local both as a trustee as well as the chairman of the Chevrolet shop committee. 
Krause, who had at the time discussed this situation with Roland, later wrote that “the 
controlling majority of the [executive] committee had their own factional reasons for wanting 
to get rid of” him and “simply arrogated the power to do so.” The FLU local #18384’s 
executive board which, as Krause put it, “essentially ran the organization” dictated the 
Toledo delegation to exclude Roland and most of the other progressives within the local.14 
With the exception of Bob Travis, none of those from Toledo who had attended the June 8th 
meeting and endorsed the platform of the progressive caucus were selected to be a delegate.15 
The other delegate chosen from the Chevrolet unit was Ben Bonner; the most conservative, 
least trusted member of the shop committee and a GM-hired Pinkerton agent.  
At the final rank and file conference which was held in Toledo a day before the 
Detroit convention, Roland publicly denounced the executive committee actions of his FLU 
local in selecting delegates. He said that the delegates from the Chevrolet unit would protest 
the actions of the Toledo executive board to the credentials committee at the Detroit 
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convention. But after some discussion, the Norwood delegates present at the conference 
volunteered to take that action. Yet this never happened because later others in that 
delegation rejected the idea because they didn’t want to take an antagonistic stance toward 
the large Toledo local.16    
This conference adopted a pamphlet created by the CDAC and subsequently handed 
out at the Detroit convention. It expressed the sentiments of the progressive caucus and its 
core principles of militancy and aggressive organizing, industrial-base unionism and 
democratic-rule rooted in membership control while condemning the red-baiting attributed to 
such a platform. Moreover, it pointed to the Toledo Chevrolet strike as an example of how 
current AFL control has inhibited unionism in the auto industry.17 But despite such 
preparations, the constraints that the AFL leadership would place on the nascent UAW 
International and its capability for self-rule prevented the implementation of the progressive 
agenda into the organization.   
During the Detroit convention, despite the undemocratic manner that the Toledo 
delegation was selected, individual members were quick to challenge the attempts by the 
AFL to assert control. On the morning of the second day of the convention, August 27th, after 
the convention committee’s report on rules was read, a Toledo delegate, Fred Mayberry, 
through a “point of privilege” moved “that all general organizers who were paid by the 
American Federation of Labor be instructed and compelled to remain away from the hotel 
and convention.” Though Dillon, the chair of the convention, immediately called that motion 
out of order, Henry Kraus observed that that first act of rebellion against AFL leadership 
during the Detroit convention resonated among many of the delegates and their desire “to run 
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their own convention and, by extension, their own International as well.”18 This battle 
continued over a resolution, sent in advance by the National Council to the UAW FLUs, 
which called for the appointment of Francis Dillon as the president of the UAW during its 
provisionary first year. In a close vote, the measure was defeated 164-112. The 38 opposing 
votes of the Toledo local played an important part in the defeat of this resolution, and 
bolstered its position as an anti-Dillon group. However, that show of rejecting AFL 
leadership wouldn’t last very long for, on the fourth day of the convention, August 29th, 
Green unceremoniously appointed both Dillon as president of the International UAW, and 
the members of the National Council (including Tom Ramsey)  as the executive board, for its 
first probationary year. He justified that action based on a provision of the charter by the 
AFL Executive Council that gave the president the power to designate International officials 
during its initial period.  Following this appointment of International officers for the UAW’s 
first year, Ellsworth Kramer, president of the FLU local #18384, in an act of defiance, moved 
to rescind the acceptance of the UAW charter that had taken place on the first day with such 
provisions attached.  His motion was seconded by Bob Travis.  Dillon responded predictably 
ruling that the motion was out of order. But Kramer declared in response “I appeal to the 
rank and file.” Though this protest couldn’t be won in those circumstances, it led to the 
election of a committee of seven at the Detroit convention to appeal such decisions to the 
Executive Council at the upcoming AFL convention in Atlantic City. George Addes was 
among those elected to that committee.19  
But before Green appointed the UAW International executive board, the Toledo local 
delegates were actively politicking and making backroom deals for the International 
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executive board elections behind the scenes. As the FLU local with the largest paid 
membership coming into the convention and, in turn, the largest delegation (38), it carried a 
lot of clout. Moreover seven of the eleven convention committees, appointed by Dillon, 
contained representation by a Toledo delegate including four officers from the executive 
board: Kramer, Schwake, Addes and Siefke.20 The delegation utilized that clout as they 
pushed the candidacy of George Addes for the position of secretary treasurer. The local 
rented a big room in the hotel that all the convention delegates were staying and served free 
drinks to sway “wavering Dillonites.” They managed to get an agreement with those from the 
Studebaker delegation from South Bend, Indiana bringing together the two strongest locals in 
the union into a voting bloc for each other’s preferred candidates with a total of 88 votes. 
Then Kramer made a deal with the Cleveland and Norwood delegation to put together more 
votes for their slate, and this brought together about half the votes for the elections into the 
Toledo camp.21 Thus the public denouncements by individual Toledo delegates of the AFL 
leadership and Dillon’s control appeared to be more of a calculated power grab than a matter 
of principle or any affinity towards the progressives. By selecting and appointing delegates 
for the Detroit convention, the executive committee could ensure that they all voted as a 
controlled bloc which they could use to shape the International executive board. But such an 
act also placed the FLU local #18384, especially its executive committee, further from its 
democratic roots and suggested the growing power this body exerted over the rest of the 
union. Also their public antagonistic stance towards Dillon during the Detroit would later 
lead to clashes with him as president of the International UAW. 
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FLU local#1838, the Dillon Charter Controversy, and the emergence of UAW local 12 and 
14 
 Following the Detroit convention, the FLU local #18384 sought to get a new charter 
within the new international auto union. By then the FLU local, as an amalgamated union, 
covered thirteen different shops 10 of which had contracts, under its charter. Dillon sought to 
break up the union by giving each of these shops their own charter. The antagonism between 
the FLU local and Dillon over this issue became a long protracted affair. Upon application 
for a International charter, FLU local #18384 received nothing but a letter bearing a special 
notice stating that it was henceforth the “adopted policy of the International” to issue charters 
only to single plants.22 Yet neither the Detroit Convention, the International UAW’s 
Constitution, nor the International’s Executive Council had made a ruling on this issue. 
Furthermore, International UAW charters had been issued by Dillon to other locals including 
those in Kansas City, St. Louis, Atlanta and Norwood who all had more than one plant under 
their respective jurisdictions.23Thus, it is clear that Dillon was purposefully targeting the 
Toledo local over this issue for purely personal reasons, for he had no legitimate 
constitutional power to do so. 
   Following this notification, the executive board of the Toledo local met with Dillon 
on several occasions. Dillon promised them that they would receive a probationary single 
charter for sixty days to give the various units time to set up separate organizations. The rank 
and file of the FLU local rejected this proposal and demanded a single charter with no strings 
attached, even voting to withhold its per-capita tax when Dillon tried to apply pressure.24 The 
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Toledo FLU told Dillon that his proposal of separation was “very dangerous” to their local.25 
After being notified of this decision, Dillon promised he would appeal to the UAW 
Executive Council over the issue of a probationary charter. After a series of meetings 
between the Toledo union and Dillon by December 30th, the executive board finally decided 
to accept the probationary charter which was valid. When that charter never came, the 
executive board made a trip to Detroit to get it from Dillon. He responded with the offer of 
separate charters which the executive board flatly refused. FLU local#18384 wouldn’t 
receive its charter to become UAW local 12 until February 16th, 1936 in a public ceremony 
following a conference a week before hand with Homer Martin, International UAW vice 
president, and Ed Hall, secretary-treasurer. The latter was the only person on the Executive 
Council that had the constitutional power to issue charters.26 
 In the midst of this controversy, in January 1936 the Toledo Chevrolet unit asked 
Dillon for a charter of its own. He subsequently granted the Toledo Chevrolet unit a charter 
as UAW Local 14. The Chevrolet Committee explained that its charter request was based 
essentially on strategic policy differences with the FLU local #18384’s executive board as 
well as the desire “to be closer to other General Motors locals.”27 As the Toledo Chevrolet 
unit learned during its strike, “local Chevrolet problems become General Motors problems 
and cannot be settled on a local basis.”28 Under their FLU local structure, they have “been 
trying to fight a national problem on a local basis” which they “have been unable to iron out 
with [their] local executives” for the past three months.29 The Toledo Chevrolet unit made it 
clear that there was “no antagonism” between the Chevrolet group and the FLU local and 
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that it was its “earnest desire to cooperate to the fullest extent” with the FLU local as well as 
with “all organized labor.”30 Furthermore, the Toledo Chevrolet unit described its act to 
separate from the FLU local not as motivated by selfishness but driven “purely and simply” 
by self-preservation.31 Ditzel later described the reason for the separation as a matter of 
“union politics.”32 Roland clashed with the FLU executive board, as clearly demonstrated in 
the selection of delegates to the Detroit convention, at the time. As a result, the executive 
committee of the FLU local wouldn’t grant them money to meet and conduct organizing 
activities with other GM locals, thus the Toledo Chevy leadership “felt that they [weren’t] 
giving [them] the help that they should have” in this effort. 33 One worker from the Spicer 
plant, who may have reflected sentiments of some on the executive board, explained the 
separation by claiming that “the Communists” or their “fellow travelers who had control of 
the Chevrolet Plant decided that things weren’t as good for them…[since] they couldn’t go 
[to the FLU executive board]” and get “money for any of their front organizations” or their 
“good fat trips.”34 
 The undemocratic manner in which the Toledo local executive board had chosen 
delegates to the Detroit was one aspect of this “union politics” that contributed to the split. 
By January 1936, the Chevrolet committee wanted to receive their charter “immediately” so 
that they could “have representation at the next convention” of their own choosing.35 The 
Chevrolet unit and the FLU executive board differed over the support of candidates running 
for International officer positions in the upcoming elections to be held during the South Bend 
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Convention. The voting bloc established between much of the Toledo delegation and the 
South Bend delegation during the Detroit convention continued in intra-union politicking 
during the first three months of 1936 leading up to the South Bend Convention. Roland 
wrote, after a discussion with George Addes, that the Toledo delegation was planning on 
supporting Carl Shipley, from the Bendix local in South Bend, Indiana, for the Vice 
President position if they supported Addes for financial secretary. Roland discouraged the 
Cleveland delegates from supporting Addes unless it was “absolutely necessary as a political 
move” claiming that he was a “reactionary” and unfit for the position.36 He asserted that the 
Chevrolet committee supported Wyndham Mortimer for President or Vice President. Since 
the Detroit convention, the Toledo Chevy leadership had been “popularizing” him among the 
members based on the organizational strength of the White Motor local that he represented as 
well as the “splendid fight” he had put up for an International Auto Union with a democratic, 
industrial structure.37 Local 14’s support for Mortimer demonstrated its progressive outlook 
and increasing ties between it and the Cleveland locals. Moreover it contrasted with the 
pragmatic, power broker mentality within the executive board of Local 12 towards the UAW 
International office.   
During the fall of 1935 while the charter controversy between the Toledo local and 
Dillon dragged on, the Chevrolet workers experienced first hand the shortcomings of an 
individual strong local union within GM. For five months after work resumed on May 14th in 
the Chevrolet plant, the union had been successful both in organizing most of the workforce 
(membership made up about 92% of the employees) and in dealing with management in 
bargaining over grievances, regulating production standards and additional concessions. But 




management, it turned out, according to Ditzel, was just “playing with [them]” like “a cat 
plays with a mouse” giving them what they wanted to keep them content during that time.38 
Following the Toledo Chevrolet strike, GM VP Knudsen had told a federal conciliator that 
the episode had caught the company “napping” and the company was determined “never to 
be in such a position again.”39 As a result, GM began implementing a decentralizing policy 
with the aim “of diversification of plants where local union strength [was] dangerous.”40 On 
October 1st, the executive shop committee in the Toledo Chevrolet plant learned that GM 
planned to move a majority of work out of the city. It subsequently met with the Plant 
Manager, Alfred G. Gulliver, on October 15th who stated that the plant would close for 
inventory and rearrangement on October 18th and that a third of the machinery would be 
moved to Saginaw, Michigan.  Later he promised that all those currently employed at the 
plant would be rehired after the remodeling was complete. During that period, the Chevrolet 
unit sent delegations to Saginaw, Michigan and Muncie, Indiana to evaluate the potential for 
organizing the work forces of the GM transmission plants at these locales. At both work 
sites, the delegations learned the extent of GM’s decentralization plan. New plants were 
being built in both cities to pull work away from the Toledo Chevrolet plant and  “covering 
all their key manufacturing plants of similar equipment, so that in [the] event of labor trouble 
in one plant it will not tie up their industry.”41 Thus it appeared that GM was trying to phase 
out the Toledo Chevrolet plant  
When the Toledo Chevrolet plant was re-opened in early November, much of the 
machinery for making transmissions had been transferred to plants in Muncie, Indiana and 
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Saginaw, Michigan. The former had been reactivated during the Toledo Chevrolet strike. 
Both were non-union plants where wage rates were as low as half of those prevailing in 
Toledo. As a result, only 1100 workers were rehired in Toledo and when the shop committee 
reminded Gulliver of his earlier promise of full employment when the factory re-opened, he 
responded by saying “yes, but I didn’t tell you where they would be hired.” Since the Toledo 
Chevrolet workers had not obtained a national agreement during their strike when they were 
in a good position to do so, GM was able to use its control over the means of production to 
shift work to non-union sites and thereby undermine the organization at Toledo. Furthermore, 
GM may have blacklisted unemployed Chevrolet union workers as many of those that tried 
to find work in other shops in Toledo were subsequently dismissed when it was discovered 
that they used to work in the Chevrolet plant.42 In these circumstances, the Toledo Chevrolet 
shop committee, as Ditzel put it, was “demoralized” and they “didn’t know what to do.”43 
 Despite the devastating impact of GM’s actions on the Toledo Chevrolet union and its 
leadership, the laid off members of the local didn’t take it quietly. The 900 workers who 
weren’t rehired resented the fact that the union had not done more to protect their jobs. In the 
middle of December they organized into a Committee of 900, elected a seven person 
membership committee, and released a statement that denounced GM’s act as part of a 
“deliberate and well-planned drive” by automobile and auto parts manufacturers “to destroy 
[their] union organization in Toledo.”44 The statement urged against desertion of the 
Chevrolet union or attempts at creating competing or dual unions within the plant for which 
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such actions would be met with “the most determined resistance from [their] ranks.”45 The 
Committee of 900 was an agitation group within the Chevrolet local to get the union to do 
more to ensure job protection. Moreover, it encouraged workers still employed in the plant to 
maintain their union loyalty and stick with the organization. With the pressure coming from 
this group, the shop committee was split over the course for the union. Three of them, 
including James Roland, favored union membership strike action while Joe Ditzel and the 
other five members of the shop committee wanted to continue negotiations for thirty more 
days.46 In response, the leadership put forward a “share-the-work-program” that the 
membership unanimously approved.   The program was designed to prevent hunger through a 
more equitable distribution of the work burden (i.e., less shifts) amongst the union 
workforce.47 Their slogan became “Everybody works or nobody works.”48 Thus the public 
agitation and activity of the laid off rank and file members put into motion an initiative that 
strengthened and saved their union. 
When presented with a charter on February 15th, Local 14 came into its own as a 
union in Toledo with a separate identity from Local 12. It elected an executive board with 
Bob Travis as the first president and Joseph Ditzel as recording secretary. Surprisingly, 
considering his prominent leading role in organizing the Chevrolet plant as well as its strike, 
Roland wasn’t elected to any position.49 But the rise of Travis to president of Local 14 
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further enmeshed the local in the progressive rank-and-file movement sweeping into the 
South Bend convention, as he became closer to one of its primary spearheads, Wyndham 
Mortimer as well as a member of the Communist Party.50 The cumulative experiences among 
the Toledo Chevrolet workers from the time beginning with strike of 1935 through the date 
of the South Bend Convention in 1936 would make the members of Local 14, as Joseph 
Ditzel put it, “more anxious to get organization started in General Motors than anybody else 
in the UAW” at the time. For they felt that the remaining jobs in the Toledo plant were at 
stake.51 By surviving efforts by GM to undermine the union in the Toledo Chevrolet plant, 
Local 14, in the words of Henry Krause, “served as one of the big [auto organizational] 
drive’s most dynamic forces” which made “its greatest contribution to the Flint sit-down in 
January 1937.”52 Under Bob Travis, Local 14 “had tremendous [organizing] activity 
everyplace” around Toledo as manifested by its organization of the workers at Toledo 
Concrete Pipe Company, Bunting Brass, Toledo Machine and Tool Company and AP Parts 
into their union. But the local’s progressive outlook and desire to organize the unorganized 
also extended beyond immediate self-interest.  Outside the auto industry, they supported the 
organizing efforts in Toledo of retail clerks, Bowling Green rubber workers, Harbaur 
Canning Company workers, dairy workers as well as waitresses. 53  
South Bend Convention, GM, and the 1936-1937 sit-down strikes  
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 As the controversy over the Toledo local’s charter in the International Union began to 
settle and both Local 12 and 14 became established, the city served as the first site for 
progressive organizing leading up to the South Bend convention in April. In early February, 
an informal caucus of delegates “from the leading progressives unions in the International” 
adopted a five point platform for further discussion at the next progressive caucus in March 
in South Bend, Indiana.54 It basically reaffirmed much of the progressive vision for the 
International Auto Union that had been building since being jumpstarted almost two years 
before by the Cleveland locals.  The platform included: Industrial unionism (full jurisdiction 
in the Auto Industry as well as amalgamation with independent auto unions), organize the 
unorganized (especially in Michigan), complete democracy, militant labor policy and a labor 
party.55 A committee of twelve members, including George Addes, was formed to put this 
platform into resolutions for approval by both the South Bend caucus and the convention in 
April. Subsequently, the South Bend caucus, attended by 200 delegates from 141 different 
locals, approved this program and its resolutions for the upcoming convention. To avoid the 
politicking that was a part of this caucus, no slate of candidates was endorsed for 
International office but it was agreed to expand the number of Vice President positions from 
one to three.56 
Right before the South Bend Convention, Travis took the lead in promoting unity 
among UAW GM locals as part of the larger organizing effort within the auto giant. He 
proposed the formation of a council of all the UAW locals within GM. At this point the 
UAW had a “foothold” within GM, though a weak one, and those locals needed to come 
together in order to prevent  the auto corporation from crushing “each [of them] 
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individually.”  Through the GM council, these locals could “realize [their] own strength” for 
the purposes of collective bargaining as an industry. 57 However, Bob Travis held back this 
plan during the South Bend Convention because of the organizational weakness of much of 
the UAW locals in their particular plants. The overriding goal for many of the GM locals at 
that moment was to bolster their own numbers and strengthen their presence where they 
already existed. The GM council, at the time, would have only represented about 2500 of 
General Motors’ 250,000 workers.58 But Travis’ initiative represented a strong attempt to 
advance and institutionalize in the UAW what Roland and the Toledo strike committee had 
tried to achieve in 1935: coordination among all GM locals to achieve a national agreement 
with General Motors. 
The South Bend convention saw both the end of direct AFL control over the UAW 
and the movement of the progressive platform to the forefront. The outcome of the first 
International elections was a good indicator of progressive strength among the leadership in 
which of the eleven elected to the International Executive Board, eight either had definite 
connections to the left wing or leaned in that direction. Mortimer was elected first Vice 
President and Addes became secretary treasurer.59 This seemed to symbolize a reconciliation 
of the intra-union political differences between Local 14 and 12 over International office that 
had preceded the South Bend convention.  
In addition to the election of a predominantly progressive leadership to the 
International UAW, the ground work for a nation-wide UAW organizational drive in the next 
year was put into place. The March caucus approved a resolution and in turn passed at the 
South Bend convention which called for such an initiative as well as raising $250,000 
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(consisting of $75,000 from the UAW locals and the rest from the AFL and “other 
sympathetic organizations”) to implement it. One of the explicit targets was GM. Mortimer 
accurately predicted that a “fight” with GM would come by the next convention while Ed 
Hall, who was elected as a Vice President, exclaimed that “General Motors will know damn 
well we are not running away from them.” 60   
With an aggressive UAW International leadership in place, the organizational 
campaign was launched on June 22. Various International officers and members of the 
Executive Council were assigned to various areas targeted for organization. Mortimer, who 
correctly saw Flint as “the most important point in the whole organization campaign,” 
oversaw the effort to organize the city which had been such a crucial holdout during the 
Toledo Chevrolet strike of 1935. By August, Travis’ proposal for a GM council was being 
put into action when following a meeting of the International Executive Board, 
representatives of the GM locals met to discuss their common problems. On September 14th, 
they met again and finally approved Travis’ plan for establishing a GM Advisory Council. 
Furthermore, the representatives created a steering committee to plan a GM organizing 
campaign of which Travis became a member.61 Despite these promising developments 
towards establishing a UAW-sponsored program of organization within GM, the real test for 
the nascent International union laid in Flint, Michigan, the heart of the GM auto empire. By 
September 27th, as a result of internal struggles taking place within the International 
executive board, Travis took over for Mortimer as organizational director in Flint.62 
In his new position as organizational director in Flint, Travis was initially hesitant 
about his own abilities to accomplish this great task. But with the encouragement of UAW 
                                                 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid, pp. 94,95,109.  
62 Ibid, p. 111. 
100  
officials, he remained in the city. Based on his contacts through the Communist Party in 
Flint, as well as an analysis of the various plants in the city, Travis decided to concentrate his 
initial organizing in the Fisher body no. 1 plant. His decision was rooted in his own previous 
experience in the Toledo Chevrolet strike of targeting a plant that, if shutdown, would have a 
maximum impact on the GM’s national production capabilities. The Fisher body no. 1 plant 
made Buick bodies and, as Travis put it, “if [they] could stop Buick bodies [from] being 
made [they] could stop Buick.”63 Travis worked through the UAW Local #156 that Mortimer 
had created out of the five old Flint FLU locals to get volunteer organizers. But he like 
Mortimer also distrusted the executive board whom he felt were filled with “stool pigeons.”64 
Thus he relied on his communist connections to establish a nucleus of union supporters 
within the Fisher Body no. 1 and no. 2 plants. He appointed his own union shop stewards for 
which he tried to keep their union affiliation a secret. In that effort in targeting the Fisher 
Body No. 1 plant, like Mortimer before him, Travis concentrated on enrolling those workers 
employed in the “body-in-white” department where the principal soldering and welding, 
essential functions within the factory, took place. 65 
During his time spent organizing in Flint, Travis also remained in regular contact with 
others from Local 14. On October 21, he reported to his local that Fisher Body No.1 was 
“just about boiling over” as organizing had proceeded well within the plant. Travis advised 
Cole, the financial secretary of Local 14, to be prepared “to come out on the street” at any 
time and to “organize every man possible that is willing to come to Flint on an hour’s 
notice.” 66 He expected the strong support of his local in the upcoming showdown with GM 
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in Flint. In late December, following Christmas, Roland came to Flint on Travis’ request, 
despite initial resistance from Homer Martin, to help with preparations for a sit-down strike 
scheduled for December 30th. But due to his unfamiliarity with the people in Flint, Roland 
didn’t “really [get] much done” there.  At the request of Adolph Germer (a representative of 
the nascent labor federation Congress of Industrial Organization that represented trade unions 
disaffected with the AFL), he went to Cleveland to help with a strike situation occurring 
there.67 On December 30th, the Flint sit-downs began in both Fisher body no. 1 and no. 2 
plants.  
With the onset of the Flint sit-down strikes and the string of strikes and sit-downs of 
UAW locals in other GM plants across the country that followed, Local 14 sprung into 
action. On January 4th the Toledo Chevrolet workers walked out and shut down their plant. In 
making this decision as “undoubtedly…the most militant local in the General Motors Plants 
with a reputation that [was] envied by many locals in the Auto Industry” along with the lay 
offs they’d faced under the GM “decentralization program” they felt it was important that the 
local “take a prominent part in this strike.”68 As a result about half of the people in the local, 
around “several hundred at a time,” went to Flint through out the sit down strike to bolster 
the efforts taking place there and to do “anything to participate in the strike” including 
maintaining a soup kitchen.69 On one occasion when the numbers of workers sitting in at the 
Fisher body No.1 plant had dwindled, Travis called on Local 14 to send in reinforcements. 
His local responded, fearing that trouble was imminent in Flint, by sending up forty or fifty 
of the “toughest guys” they could find. According to a union steward in the plant he had 
                                                 
67 Roland, interview with Mosier, August 12, 1981. p. 94 
68 “at a mass meeting”  UAW Local 14 collection, Box 26, folder 15  
69 Ditzel, interview by Skeels, Sept. 25, 1960, p.12 
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“never seen a bunch of guys that were so ready for blood in [his] life.”70 On January 11th, 
when strikers repelled the Flint police and company guards from entering Fisher Body plant 
No. 2, in what later became famously known as “The Battle of the Running Bulls” Local 14 
members were among those involved in this struggle. In a press release published three days 
after the event, the local wrote that it “was proud that many of its members took an active 
part in repelling the assault” and despite some of them being wounded would “not hesitate to 
go into action again if need be” to achieve the UAW International’s demand for a national 
agreement.71   In late January, Local 14 members Roland and Ditzel were also part of union 
conflicts in Anderson, Indiana and Saginaw, Michigan but due to GM-incited violence and 
police action in those areas, neither of those efforts turned out as successful as at Flint. 72 
Finally on February 11th, ten days after the daring seizure of Chevrolet Plant #4 that tipped 
the balance of the Flint sit-down strike in the direction of the UAW, GM finally capitulated 
and agreed to a national agreement with the union.73 
Conclusion 
 The victory that came out of Flint sit-down strike was, in part, a culmination of the 
rank and file energy among auto workers towards promoting and creating an International 
UAW that was militant and democratic in character. The 1935 Toledo Chevrolet Strike had 
helped advance this movement when, in its aftermath, AFL leadership decided to launch an 
International UAW. Moreover, Progressives from the Toledo FLU, especially those from the 
Chevy unit, during this time became a part in shaping and pushing forward this movement. In 
                                                 
70 Sit-down, Sidney Fine, p. 169 
71 “Toledo, Ohio—1/14/37” UAW Local 14 collection, box 26, folder 15 
72 Sit-down, Sidney Fine, p. 196&197, p. 215 Ditzel was chased by vigilantes and escorted by police out of 
town, while Roland got kicked out Anderson, Indiana several hours after he’d arrived when police raided his 
hotel room 
73 ibid, p. 303. 
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this effort, leaders from the Toledo Chevy union spearheaded the initiative they began in 
their 1935 strike, national coordination of GM locals for a shared strike policy. With 
institutional support in place following the South Bend Convention of 1936, this effort to 
take on GM began in earnest and Flint, Michigan became the prime target. Once the sit-down 
strikes their got under way, volumes of militant support from Local 14 came up to take part 




 The history of the UAW AFL FLU local #18384 from its birth into the creation of 
International UAW as Local #12 and #14 and the Flint sit-down strike of 1936-1937 reflects 
the broader evolution of these auto worker local unions from separate entities under control 
of the American Federation of Labor into a separate International UAW with a national 
orientation. This historical trajectory demonstrated the importance of  FLU local #18384’s 
community roots and the activism of its progressives leading to the UAW’s national 
campaign against GM. At the time of the FLU local’s founding, the Toledo labor movement 
had been effectively crushed under years of local business elite led union busting with 
support from the city government. Thus for the FLU local to ever become an established 
presence in the city’s economy and gain union recognition as well as firm collective 
bargaining agency, it was going to have to confront this power structure. This challenge 
ultimately came from the Auto Lite Company whose management was prepared to go to the 
very limits to avoid recognizing organized labor in their plant. When the second strike in the 
Auto Lite plant came about on April 13th, the company wasted little time seeking to put this 
down several days later through an old legal weapon, the court injunction. Immediately the 
sympathetic judge ordered a restraining order on picketing while the injunction suit hearings 
took place and the FLU local union officers complied. Among the membership stirrings to 
take more direct action emerged as a group of the rank and file teamed up with the LCUL to 
purposefully violate this judicial order. This decision towards mass civil disobedience and 
the community upsurge that accompanied that effectively broke the picket restraining order 
ushered in the violent string of events that led to the eventual union agreement with the Auto 
Lite Company and in turn secured the position of organized labor in Toledo. 
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 Out of this effective challenge to the business power structure over Toledo’s 
economy, the resurgence of the city’s labor movement along with the activities of 
progressives in the FLU local brought organizing into the Toledo Chevrolet plant. Owned by 
the national automobile corporation GM, the strike that took place in this factory in 1935 
required a different strategy. To get significant concessions from this auto giant including a 
signed agreement, the Toledo strikers had to thoroughly cripple its national production which 
meant coordinating with other GM FLU locals to join in the walk out. Through this effort, 
they sought to create a joint strike policy to bring about a shared national agreement with 
GM. Though initially successful, both the efforts of Dillon along with the FLU local 
executive committee inhibited this national scheme. Eventually, Toledo Chevy workers 
accepted a less than desirable agreement put forth by GM that met few of their demands 
including a signed contract.  
 From this strike and the partial victory that resulted came a strong impetus for an 
International UAW of which the rank and file activity and energy within the Toledo FLU 
local now took on an increasing national dimension. Toledo progressives’ desire for rank and 
file controlled unionism, especially among the Chevy leadership, brought them into a 
national grassroots movement emanating from Cleveland to promote an International UAW 
reflecting such a vision. At the top, the AFL leadership finally decided to launch the 
International UAW at the Detroit convention in August, 1935. Within FLU local#18384 
many of the progressives were denied membership into the Toledo delegation to the 
convention including most of the Chevy leadership. This came about after the executive 
committee decided to appoint the delegates rather than let membership vote on them. Such an 
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action by the FLU local executive board as well as other lingering tensions between it and the 
Toledo Chevy shop, led the latter to seek a separate charter to become Local 14. 
 Later, when GM shifted out a significant amount of production from the Toledo 
Chevy plant UAW Local 14, became even more determined to achieve a national agreement 
with the auto giant. Bob Travis, Local 14’s president, became the primary spearhead in this 
effort both in coordinating between GM UAW locals as well as organizing the Flint Sit-down 
strikes. Once the latter action was underway, Local 14 membership mobilized by shutting 
down its plant through a strike and then coming up to Flint, Michigan to support in anyway 
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